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Nederlandstalige samenvatting 
 
 
 
 
 
De fractie huiseigenaars is sinds het einde van de Tweede Wereldoorlog sterk gestegen in de 
meeste Westerse landen, waaronder België. De volkstelling van 1947 rapporteerde dat 
38,9% van de huishoudens de woning bezit waarin men is gehuisvest. Vandaag is dit meer 
dan 70%. België begeeft zich daarmee tot de koplopers binnen Europa, vergezeld door 
hoofdzakelijk mediterrane landen. De sterke stijging kwam er mede onder impuls van de 
verschillende overheden doorheen de jaren, gebruik makend van diverse fiscale stimuli, 
subsidies en regelgeving. Er zijn verschillende positieve aspecten denkbaar die een 
stimulering van huiseigenaarschap legitimeren. Echter, vanuit de optiek van dit doctoraal 
proefschrift, achten we een hoge fractie eigenaars als ongunstig. Het gebrek aan mobiliteit 
van huiseigenaars heeft namelijk nefaste gevolgen voor de arbeidsmarkt. In deze context 
verklaarde Andrew Oswald midden jaren ‘90 de positieve correlatie tussen de graad van 
huiseigenaarschap en de werkloosheidsgraad. De hoge kosten bij het kopen en verkopen van 
een woning, leiden tot een lagere geografische mobiliteit van eigenaars tegenover huurders. 
Wanneer een regio geconfronteerd wordt met een negatieve schok van de vraag naar 
arbeid, zullen huiseigenaars minder geneigd zijn deze te ontvluchten. De hoge verhuiskosten 
leiden tot een hoger reserveringsloon en een lagere zoekintensiteit wat betreft jobs buiten 
de directe omgeving. Op het geaggregeerde niveau gaat volgens Oswald een hogere 
eigenaarschapsgraad gepaard met een lager effectief arbeidsaanbod, resulterend in hogere 
lonen en een lagere werkzaamheidsgraad. 
Wanneer we de empirische literatuur naderbij bekijken, zien we dat de conclusies 
grotendeels uiteenvallen volgens het niveau waarop de relatie bestudeerd wordt. Macro 
studies, die gebruik maken van geaggregeerde data, observeren veelal negatieve effecten 
van de fractie eigenaars op de arbeidsmarkt. Anderzijds vinden micro studies dat 
huiseigenaarschap eerder positieve gevolgen heeft voor de individuele 
arbeidsmarktomstandigheden, of geen significant effect. Vanuit deze ogenschijnlijke 
tegenstelling, hebben we deze relatie onderzocht voor België vanuit drie verschillende 
invalshoeken. 
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Onderzoeksaanpak en resultaten 
In de eerste studie van dit proefschrift (Hoofdstuk 2) testen we rechtstreeks de Oswald 
hypothese, gebruik makend van data op het niveau van de Belgische arrondissementen. We 
beschikken daarbij over gegevens die zich uitstrekken van 1970 tot 2005. We schatten het 
effect van het percentage eigenaars op de werkzaamheidsgraad en controleren voor een 
reeks andere factoren zoals loonkloof, scholing en demografie. We hechten veel aandacht 
aan enkele methodologische kwesties die in voorgaande onderzoeken vaak onderbelicht 
bleven. We tonen aan dat de resultaten sterk kunnen afwijken wanneer niet de nodige 
voorzorgen worden genomen. Onze resultaten bevestigen de Oswald hypothese voor de 
Belgische arrondissementen. De schattingen tonen aan dat een stijging van het percentage 
eigenaars met 1 procentpunt, een significante vermindering van de werkzaamheidsgraad 
met 0,35 procentpunten teweegbrengt. We constateren bovendien dat de omvang van dit 
effect afhankelijk is van de scholingsgraad binnen het arrondissement. Het Oswald effect is 
minder sterk als de fractie hooggeschoolden hoger is. Deze bevinding is consistent met de 
theorie. Hoger geschoolden zullen omwille van de relatief hogere lonen die hen worden 
aangeboden, minder geremd zijn in hun mobiliteit. 
In Hoofdstuk 3 stellen we ons de vraag of aan de onderliggende assumptie van de Oswald 
hypothese is voldaan. Meer bepaald onderzoeken we of huiseigenaars inderdaad minder 
makkelijk verhuizen dan huurders. We gebruiken hierbij PSBH data voor de periode 1994-
2002 en EU-SILC data voor de recentere periode 2004-2009. We controleren ook voor een 
hele reeks andere familiale en omgevingsfactoren. In onze analyse worden eigenaars verder 
onderverdeeld naargelang ze een hypothecaire lening hebben lopen en maken we een 
onderscheid tussen sociale huurders en private huurders. Onze resultaten suggereren dat 
eigenaarschap inderdaad een rem is op de verhuismobiliteit. Het negatieve effect is nog 
sterker in het geval van een hypothecaire lening. Dit is theoretisch te verklaren door de 
hogere kosten die eigenaars met een lening ervaren bij een verhuis. Deze omvatten 
bijkomende registratierechten, notaris- en bankkosten. Private huurders hebben de hoogste 
verhuiskans, gevolgd door sociale huurders. De globale bevindingen bevestigen de 
onderliggende voorwaarde voor het zich kunnen manifesteren van een Oswald effect. 
Hoofdstuk 4 onderzoekt op microniveau de impact van eigenaarschap op de 
werkloosheidsduur. De EU-SILC data verschaffen informatie over het individueel 
arbeidsmarktstatuut met een maandelijkse nauwkeurigheid. Voor de periode 2003-2008 
beschikken we over een steekproef van 1013 werkloosheidsintervallen. De belangrijkste 
bijdrage in hoofdstuk 4 is de aanvullende opdeling van huiseigenaars in eigenaars mét en 
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zonder hypotheek. Hoewel dit binnen de empirische literatuur tot heden slechts beperkt aan 
bod is gekomen, werd deze onderverdeling stevig onderbouwd in recent theoretisch 
onderzoek. De woonkosten blijken daarbij van primordiaal belang te zijn. Wanneer deze 
hoog zijn (dus in het geval van hypothecaire afbetalingen), gaat men intensiever op zoek 
naar werk met een kortere werkloosheidsduur tot gevolg. Eigenaars zonder hypotheek, en 
dus met lage woonkosten, worden verwacht langer in de werkloosheid te verkeren. Onze 
resultaten bevestigen deze hypothese en leggen op die manier een rijkere dynamiek bloot 
dan in de voorgaande papers het geval was. Wanneer geen rekening wordt gehouden met 
het al dan niet hebben van een hypothecaire lening, is het verschil tussen eigenaars en 
huurders niet significant. Onze resultaten kunnen mogelijk de tegenstrijdige bevindingen in 
de voorgaande literatuur verklaren door te wijzen op het verschillend gewicht binnen de 
steekproef van eigenaars mét en zonder hypotheek. 
Besluit 
Onze resultaten houden de ogenschijnlijke tegenstelling binnen het empirisch veld 
grotendeels overeind. Enerzijds concluderen we in Hoofdstuk 2 dat, op basis van 
geaggregeerde data, huiseigenaarschap heel nefast is voor de werkzaamheidsgraad. 
Anderzijds blijkt uit Hoofdstuk 4 dat de individuele situatie van huiseigenaars gemiddeld 
genomen niet verschilt van die van huurders wat de werkloosheidsduur betreft. De 
resultaten onthullen het belang van woonkosten maar tonen ook aan dat het Oswald effect 
geen dominante rol speelt op het micro niveau. 
Beide conclusies kunnen gerijmd worden door te verwijzen naar de negatieve 
externe effecten van huiseigenaarschap. Deze effecten zijn niet exclusief van voelbaar door 
de huiseigenaar zelf maar spelen in op de gehele arbeidsmarkt. Ten eerste zullen eigenaars 
door de gebrekkige verhuismobiliteit meer geneigd zijn om te pendelen over langere 
afstanden. De hieruit resulterende verzadiging van het weg- en spoorwegverkeer 
veroorzaakt extra kosten voor zowel werknemers als bedrijven. Ten tweede leidt een hoge 
eigenaarschapsgraad tot een uitdunning van de huurmarkt. Het afgenomen aanbod aan 
huurwoningen remt dan ook de verhuismobiliteit van huurders. Ten derde wordt vaak 
geargumenteerd dat gebieden met veel eigenaars wantrouwiger staan tegenover lokale 
bedrijfsinvesteringen uit schrik voor onaangename neveneffecten. Hierdoor zullen bedrijven 
minder makkelijk de weg vinden naar deze streken wat verder de werkgelegenheid onderuit 
haalt. Ten slotte volgt uit de theorie dat een verdringingseffect kan optreden. Aangezien 
huiseigenaars hogere verhuiskosten ervaren, zullen ze meer gemotiveerd zijn om te werken 
in de eigen streek en zich tevreden stellen met een lager loon. De mogelijkheid bestaat dat 
vi 
 
hierdoor andere werknemers uit de arbeidsmarkt geprijsd worden. Deze vier tendensen 
verklaren de mogelijkheid dat het Oswald effect enkel op het macro-economisch niveau 
waar te nemen is. 
In het eerste hoofdstuk van dit doctoraal proefschrift buigen we ons over de mogelijke 
beleidsimplicaties die naar aanleiding van het geobserveerde Oswald effect kunnen 
voorgesteld worden. Ten eerste is het wenselijk dat eigenaarschap niet blindweg gepromoot 
wordt. Een gezonder evenwicht kan bereikt worden indien de overheid ijvert voor tenure 
neutrality. Dit is de toestand waarbij individuen hun beslissing om huiseigenaar of huurder te 
zijn, enkel laten afhangen van hun persoonlijke voorkeur en niet van overheidsstimuli. 
Concreet pleiten we voor de afbouw van maatregelen die huiseigenaarschap overmatig 
promoten, zoals de fiscale aftrek voor hypothecaire woonkredieten. We adviseren om hierbij 
voorzichtig te werk te gaan om de markt niet overmatig onder druk te zetten en zodoende 
een te sterke daling van de woningprijzen te vermijden. Anderzijds kan een aanbodbeleid ter 
bevordering van kwalitatieve huurwoningen de huursector veerkrachtiger maken. 
Ten tweede kan het Oswald effect gematigd worden door rechtstreeks in te spelen 
op de mobiliteit van huiseigenaars. Enerzijds kan in de marge van het actief 
arbeidsmarktbeleid een maatregel uitgewerkt worden waarbij de overheid een deel van de 
verhuiskosten op zich neemt indien dit gepaard gaat met tewerkstelling in een andere regio. 
Anderzijds pleiten we voor een verdere verlaging van de registratierechten en een 
uitbreiding van het systeem van meeneembaarheid. Beiden zullen de verhuismobiliteit ten 
goede komen. Bovendien is deze maatregel complementair met het uitdoven van de fiscale 
aftrek op verschillende vlakken: budgettair, het effect op de woningprijzen, het effect van de 
relatieve kost van kopen tegenover huren en misschien het allerbelangrijkst… de politieke 
haalbaarheid. Woonbeleid is een heel gevoelig onderwerp binnen de publieke opinie. De 
overheveling van de woonbonus naar de regionale overheden in 2014, biedt de kans én de 
noodzaak om het woonbeleid grondig te hervormen. Het wordt een moeilijke politieke 
oefening. Laten we alvast hopen dat het nastreven van doelmatig beleid het haalt van de 
emotionele argumenten. De Belg en zijn baksteen. 
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Introduction 
 
1. General context and motivation 
Homeownership rates have increased strongly in most developed countries since the 
Second World War. This increase partly resulted from a wide range of policy measures that 
encouraged the purchase of a house. Many positive externalities of homeownership can be 
thought of to legitimize these incentives. From a labour market perspective however, the 
effects of a high fraction of homeowners are less beneficial. The next three chapters of this 
dissertation analyse the outcomes of housing tenure from this particular perspective. 
Oswald (1996, 1997) was among the first to elaborately study this relationship. He 
developed a theory that explains higher unemployment rates in some countries as the 
result of higher rates of homeownership. A key element in this view is that high costs of 
buying and selling homes make homeowners less geographically mobile than tenants. When 
a region is hit by an adverse labour demand shock, it is expected that homeowners are less 
likely to move. The higher moving cost that they experience, causes higher reservation 
wages for distant jobs and lowers their search intensity for these jobs. At the aggregate 
level, a higher number of homeowners implies lower effective labour supply in each region 
and each labour market segment, with higher wages and lower employment as a result. 
Empirical studies reveal a remarkable difference depending on whether they 
investigate the relationship between homeownership and labour market outcomes at the 
macro or the micro level. Most macro studies, with some exceptions, support the Oswald 
hypothesis that higher rates of homeownership in a region or country imply inferior labour 
market outcomes. On the other hand, most micro studies find that homeowners have 
better labour market perspectives than tenants, certainly not worse. Given this apparent 
contradiction, we conduct three studies, analysing the topic from a variety of angles. 
Chapter 2 of this dissertation analyses the relationship at the aggregate level, more 
specifically the effect of the share of homeowners on the aggregate employment rate in 
Belgian districts. In Chapter 3, we focus on the main channel through which the Oswald 
effect runs. We explain mobility at the individual household level as a function of housing 
4 
 
tenure choice amongst a range of control variables. Last, we analyse the effect of 
homeownership on unemployment duration at the microeconomic level. We test whether 
homeowners have shorter or longer unemployment spells. Both micro studies also concern 
Belgium. A review of the three papers is given in the next section, each time discussing the 
research question, data sources, contributions and conclusions. 
2. Research questions, results, and contributions 
Chapter 2 is a direct empirical test of the Oswald hypothesis at the macro level. Controlling 
for a range of other regressors, we measure the effect of the fraction of homeowners on 
employment. To accomplish this, we use a panel of 42 Belgian districts in the period 1970-
2005. The broad time range is unique and enables us to adequately estimate the effects of 
only slowly changing variables like the share of homeownership, the skill level, and 
demography. Our results confirm the Oswald hypothesis for Belgium. Estimates show that a 
1 percentage point rise in the rate of ownership in a district implies a statistically significant 
fall in the employment rate by about 0.35 percentage points. As to the determinants of the 
size of the Oswald effect, we find that it falls in the fraction of high skilled in a district. This 
result supports the theory described by Dohmen (2005). Because of the better wage 
perspectives for the high skilled, moving costs will less impede the mobility of this group. We 
also obtain indicative results that the Oswald effect may be stronger in districts closer to a 
border, and in districts farther away from major cities and centres of economic activity, but 
these findings are not statistically significant. 
Our main result in favour of Oswald’s hypothesis survives various robustness checks. 
Nonetheless, some of the choices that we make in this paper may require further 
clarification. First, unlike most of Oswald’s analyses, our benchmark model contains the 
employment rate as dependent variable, instead of the unemployment rate. We prefer to 
focus on employment for two reasons. First of all, the employment rate has become the 
main policy objective for labour market performance in Europe since the Lisbon Summit in 
2000. In other words, the parameter of interest for policy makers has shifted since the time 
Oswald launched his hypothesis. Furthermore, the employment rate as performance 
indicator is much less vulnerable to distortions caused by policy measures (including 
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statistical operations) that serve to mitigate negative labour demand shocks (such as early 
retirement programs). In this scenario, these shocks are not fully observed by the 
unemployment rate. 
Second, it is plausible that the size of the observed regions has an impact on the 
estimated effect, yet it is not clear in which direction. The larger the area, the higher the 
chance that zones with high homeownership rates and zones with low homeownership rates 
cancel each other out, concealing the effects. On the other hand, when analysing very small 
cross-sectional units (or in the extreme case individuals, as in the micro studies), one is not 
able to capture the external effects of homeownership. We have reason to believe that the 
size of the districts used in our research is adequate. If the external effects would transcend 
the borders of the districts, we would expect spatial autocorrelation. Tests reveal that this is 
not the case. Third, because of data constraints, Brussels itself is not included in our panel. 
Although Brussels is an outlier when it comes to homeownership rate, it is most unlikely that 
one observation would seriously alter the results. As a last sensitivity analysis, we exclude 
the districts neighbouring Brussels. This results in an Oswald effect that is slightly larger, 
which is consistent with the above described interaction of districts close to a major city. 
Chapter 3 focusses on residential mobility in Belgium. Using micro data, we estimate the 
probability of a residential move as a function of housing tenure, area characteristics and 
household characteristics. The Oswald hypothesis explicitly presumes that homeowners are 
less mobile than tenants. A longitudinal dataset covering the period 1994-2002 is derived 
from the Panel Survey for Belgian Households (PSBH). Likewise, we use the European Union 
Statistics on Income and Living Conditions (EU-SILC) to cover the more recent period 2004-
2009. Because the two datasets are not directly comparable, we employ both panels 
separately. The wide range of socio-economic variables that is provided in the datasets 
allows us to control for age, family structure, educational level, nationality, income and 
room stress. The area characteristics are derived from Cambridge Econometrics data and 
data from the ‘FOD Economie’, Belgian Federal Government. These imply the provincial 
unemployment rate, regional dummies and a list of variables capturing housing supply. 
We further subdivide tenants as tenants paying market value rent versus ‘social’ 
tenants paying a subsidized rent, and homeowners as outright homeowners versus 
homeowners with a mortgage. Both distinctions are meaningful. Because social tenants have 
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the possibility of losing their privileges when moving, they are expected to be less mobile 
than private tenants. Furthermore, having or not having a mortgage can influence residential 
mobility for homeowners in various ways. A mortgage can hamper mobility because of the 
supplementary transaction costs and the risk for lock-in effects in case of negative equity. On 
the other hand, Caldera Sánchez and Andrews (2011) argue that the monthly payments of 
mortgage holders increase the probability of moving, in order to improve their labour 
market perspectives, and so avoid unemployment. Our results suggest that tenants are the 
most mobile group, especially those paying market value rent. Homeowners with a 
mortgage are the least mobile. Although this is in line with most of the preceding studies, 
earlier results for Belgium revealed no significant difference between outright owners and 
mortgagees. Methodologically, in this paper we make progress on the existing literature by 
paying particular attention to (and dealing with) econometric issues such as unobserved 
heterogeneity and state dependence. However, we also obtain some indications that the 
strict exogeneity assumption may be violated for some regressors, implying that we cannot 
exclude the possibility of some bias in our estimated coefficients. 
Chapter 4 studies the impact of housing tenure choice on unemployment duration. By using 
the EU-SILC data for Belgium, we are able to analyse household behaviour in the recent 
period 2003-2008. The dataset provides detailed information of a person’s activity status in 
each month. We use the spells of unemployment that start after a period of employment 
(i.e. left-censored spells are withheld). A spell can end with re-employment or with right-
censoring. We use a mixed proportional hazard model to estimate the effect of housing 
tenure on unemployment duration, controlling for a wide range of other variables. We take 
into account the potential selectivity bias that may arise if a person’s unobserved 
characteristics affect both his unemployment duration and housing tenure. One might 
falsely interpret the combination of these events as a causal relationship from housing 
tenure to unemployment. To resolve this issue, we simultaneously estimate a mixed 
multinomial logit model explaining housing tenure, along the hazard model for 
unemployment duration. We use instrumental variables (exclusion restrictions) to 
econometrically identify the housing tenure effect. These are variables that influence 
housing tenure but do not directly affect unemployment duration. As a first instrument, we 
adopt the aggregate fraction of homeowners from the study of van Leuvensteijn and Koning 
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(2004), in our case at the provincial level. Second, we contribute to the existing literature by 
adding a new instrument, i.e. the relative price of buying the house versus renting in the 
year of purchase or contract. 
Previous research using a similar methodology found evidence for shorter 
unemployment spells among homeowners than tenants (Munch et al., 2006) or no 
significant difference between both groups (Battu et al., 2008), and therefore clearly 
contradicted the Oswald hypothesis. Our main contribution lies in the investigated 
distinction between housing tenure types, in particular the different types of 
homeownership. According to the theoretical search model of Rouwendal and Nijkamp 
(2010), homeowners have shorter unemployment durations when housing expenses are 
high. These housing expenses are primarily determined by whether the individual has a 
mortgage or not. Our results show that homeowners with a mortgage have, ceteris paribus, 
the shortest unemployment spells while outright owners stay unemployed the longest. 
Tenants take an intermediate position. When we do not make the distinction, no significant 
difference between owners and tenants is observed, consistent with the results of Battu et 
al. (2008). Our results demonstrate the relevance of the distinction that we introduce. Two 
important conclusions emerge from this. First, liquidity constraints and the induced 
reduction of consumption caused by housing costs, seem to play a more prominent role than 
mobility constraints. Second, our results suggest that the discrepancy between the findings 
of the preceding studies, might be the result of a different composition of the group of 
homeowners in the respective countries that were studied. More specifically, the Danish 
group of homeowners, studied by Munch et al. (2006) consists of a higher fraction of 
mortgage holders than the British group of homeowners (Battu et al., 2008) and the 
homeowners in our sample. The higher weight of this mortgage subgroup may shift the 
results to better labour market outcomes for homeowners. If data allow, further research is 
desirable in which liquidity constraints can be taken into account more directly. 
3.What it all boils down to: disentangling the apparent contradiction 
Our analysis of residential mobility in Chapter 3 proves that homeowners are indeed less 
residentially mobile than tenants. Apparently they face a higher mobility cost which would 
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make them more vulnerable to unemployment, the so-called Oswald effect. However, 
Chapter 4 reveals no significant difference in unemployment duration between tenants and 
the average homeowner. Using a search-theoretic model, Munch et al. (2006) demonstrate 
the appearance of an alternative link between homeownership and unemployment 
duration, which may undermine the Oswald effect. According to this model, the effect of a 
higher reservation wage for distant jobs is partly counterbalanced by the effect of a lower 
reservation wage for local jobs. It is therefore possible that homeowners have a higher 
matching probability compared to tenants in the local labour market. Coulson and Fisher 
(2002) emphasise the importance of social networks in the search for work. Homeowners 
tend to invest more in their social network which improves their local job opportunities. 
These arguments provide theoretical grounds for the better or equal labour market 
performance of homeowners at the micro level. They support the results found in the 
empirical literature. 
The question remains how the at first sight contradictory macro results in Chapter 2 
and micro results in Chapter 4 can be reconciled. The answer lays in the external effects of 
homeownership. We sum up a number of considerations revealing that the negative effects 
are not necessarily concentrated within the segment of the homeowners. In these cases, 
being a homeowner does not directly harm the labour market outcomes of the homeowner 
himself. However, it generates negative effects on the labour market in general. First, as an 
alternative option to moving, one can commute over a longer distance to ameliorate labour 
market perspectives. At the individual level, reservation wages increase with commuting 
distance. Nevertheless, it might still be more favourable than moving if the latter induces 
high costs. Indeed, as argued in a recent study of Kantor et al. (2012), homeowners accept 
longer commutes. When the rate of homeownership is high, traffic congestion will increase 
commuting costs for every individual worker and raise overall production costs for firms. 
This may further undermine employment. Second, the overall promotion of homeownership 
might undermine the development of a well-functioning rental market. This might increase 
moving costs for tenants and hamper the efficiency of the labour market. Third, 
Blanchflower and Oswald (2013) refer to the possibility of zoning restrictions and NIMBY 
effects, enforced by the group of homeowners. This might impede business activity and 
consequently employment. Last, Laamanen (2013) argues that the high search intensity and 
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low reservation wages of homeowners for local jobs, might lead to displacement of other 
workers in the same region. The net effect for employment at the aggregate level depends 
on the ratio of the number of displaced workers to the number of homeowners who find 
new employment. The author provides arguments for the possibility of an increase in the 
unemployment rate with the fraction of homeownership, in both the short and the long run. 
These four negative externalities of homeownership explain the possibility that the Oswald 
effect is observed only at the aggregate level. 
4. Policy implications 
From the conclusions in the previous sections, we can deduce a number of policy 
recommendations that can improve labour market outcomes. 
• Stop tax deductibility of mortgage payments for new mortgages; 
• Decrease transaction costs for buying and selling a house; 
• Implement supply-side policies to support the rental market; 
• Implement active labour market policies that directly stimulate residential mobility; 
Because housing policy in Belgium is a regional matter, it is convenient to concentrate on the 
Flemish Region throughout this discussion. Let us first target attention at a number of 
noteworthy characteristics of the Flemish housing policy. An extensive study of the current 
situation is provided by Heylen and Winters (2012). They list the various policy measures and 
compare their respective burden on the government’s budget. From their data, we can 
derive that a large extent of the budget is spent on demand-side policies, mainly 
encouraging homeownership. More specifically, they calculate that in 2012 the total budget 
to support homeowners was 5.6 times larger than the budget supporting tenants.The main 
expense is tax deductibility of mortgage payments which accounted for 1400 million in 2012, 
as opposed to 864 million for all other housing policies together. As of today, this tax 
deduction is a federal matter but from 2014 onwards it will be the responsibility of the 
regional level. 
Heylen and Winters (2012) also reveal that households with higher incomes receive 
the highest financial support in case of property acquisition, rendering a so-called Matthew 
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effect. The argument of supporting homeownership as a protection against poverty is 
therefore not consistent with today’s policy. There are two reasons why this inequality 
emerges. First, it results from the nature of tax deductibility in a progressive tax system. The 
amount can be deducted from the highest tax bracket, resulting in a higher tax refund for 
high incomes
1
. Second, the demand-side policies supporting ownership generate a strong 
incentive to buy a house instead of renting. People who can afford it, will be inclined to 
become a homeowner regardless of their preferences. This will push up the aggregate 
homeownership rate. Because the lowest income households benefit more from rent 
subsidies, this group will be inclined to be a tenant. To sum up, both sides of the income 
spectrum lack tenure neutrality. Below, we extract a number of suggestions to policy 
makers, considering the conclusions from this dissertation. Although many other factors 
might inspire policy makers, our focus remains on the labour market implications of housing 
tenure choice. 
We learned that the perceived Oswald effect in macroeconomic empirical work, is most 
likely the result of the negative external effects caused by homeowners. In our opinion, 
there are two major remedies to mitigate the Oswald effect. On the one hand, one can 
lower the rate of homeowners and on the other hand, one can remove the underlying 
determinant, the restricted geographical mobility of homeowners. 
First, how and to what extent can the rate of homeownership be reduced to a more 
moderate fraction? For example, policy makers can facilitate supply in qualitative rental 
housing using subsidies and regulation. However, as long as the incentives to become a 
homeowner are sustained, the effect might be limited for the simple reason that owners of 
rental houses may sell them. The rental house may then turn into an owner-occupied house. 
A more effective path is restoring tenure neutrality. Without doubt, the most conspicuous 
market distortion is the tax deductibility of mortgage payments. We recommend to 
eliminate this disproportional stimulus for becoming a homeowner. For two reasons, we 
advise to retain the benefits granted for existing mortgages, at least to some level or for a 
certain amount of time. First, the households that bought a house have taken into account 
the current and future benefits they are entitled to, while making a budget. The unexpected 
                                                          
1
 Since 2012, this is much less the case since a reform was implemented in which the percentage of tax 
deduction has been fixed at 45%, irrespective of the highest tax bracket. 
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loss of these benefits might disrupt the household’s budget. Second, the elimination of the 
tax deductibility is likely to have a negative impact on house prices. Because the Belgian 
housing market (as in many other countries) is characterized by an inelastic supply
2
, we can 
expect that demand-side policies will, to a large extent, be absorbed by fluctuations in the 
price, especially in the short run. Although this might seem beneficial for future buyers, it is 
very harmful for current mortgage holders. The negative equity causes so-called lock-in 
effects. These imply a strong restraint on mobility of this group of homeowners. Also on a 
larger scale, a strong decline in the average house price can be detrimental for an economy. 
Therefore, caution is needed. Achieving tenure neutrality is an indispensable objective. 
Nevertheless, it will only slowly affect the aggregate rate of homeownership. 
Second, how can we increase residential mobility? Higher mobility is not only desirable 
from a labour market perspective but also to achieve a more efficient matching of housing 
according to household (life cycle related) needs. First, governments can directly encourage 
mobility by financially compensating the costs that the unemployed experience when 
moving closer to a new employer. This type of subsidizing can be a complementary tool in 
the context of activation programs. Within housing policy today, a similar subsidy exists 
when a household moves to a more adequate residence. It may be useful to implement it for 
moves to a more adequate labour market as well. Second, a more straightforward policy 
instrument to stimulate mobility, is directly decreasing the cost of mobility. In 2002, the 
government of the Flemish region introduced the portability of the transaction taxes. In 
particular, if an owner-occupier buys a new residence, the transaction taxes paid for the 
initial residence are deducted from the new transaction taxes. A useful policy measure, 
because moving costs for the typically immobile homeowners decrease. We recommend to 
increase the maximum portability and further ease its conditions. Today, the rights expire 
after two years which is an incentive to remain a homeowner. It is in conflict with tenure 
neutrality. Additionally, we would recommend reducing overall transfer taxes, which further 
decreases mobility costs. This will generate the appropriate mobility incentives, as has been 
empirically proven by van Ommeren and van Leuvensteijn (2005), in the case of the 
Netherlands. 
                                                          
2
 For estimates of the responsiveness of new housing supply to prices in Belgium and other OECD countries, we 
refer to Caldera Sánchez and Johansson (2011). 
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Housing policy attracts a lot of attention from the public opinion. This is not surprising 
because housing expenses take a large part of the household’s budget. Moreover, owning a 
house is often a very substantial part of the household’s total wealth. Changes in housing 
policy are therefore a very sensitive subject matter for the vast majority. From the four 
policy recommendations, two are likely to have a large impact on household’s behaviour: 
eliminating tax deductibility of mortgage payments and reducing transaction costs. We 
believe that these two measures are complementary for four reasons. First, only lowering 
transaction costs would further encourage homeownership. This effect will be outweighed 
by the dissuasive effect of the ceased tax deductibility. Second, the expected drop in house 
prices caused by the latter, will be counterbalanced to some extent by the first. As described 
above, a very strong correction in house prices is harmful for mortgage holders. 
Furthermore, it can impair the economic system. Third, both policy measures are compatible 
for the government’s budget. As shown above, the tax deduction is a heavy burden on the 
budget. Ending it will generate room to cut transaction taxes and imply other measures 
improving the quality and sustainability of the housing stock. Last, the momentum is just 
right. As the tax deductibility for mortgage payments becomes a regional matter, it offers 
the Flemish Government the opportunity to rethink its housing policy. Choices have to be 
made because budget constraints force the policy makers to do so. Ceasing the tax 
deductibility will require political decisiveness. Cutting transaction costs may support its 
political feasibility. 
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Abstract 
A.J. Oswald argues that high rates of homeownership may imply inferior labour market 
outcomes. Using a panel of 42 Belgian districts since the 1970s and accounting for other key 
determinants of employment, this paper confirms the Oswald hypothesis. A 1 percentage 
point rise in the rate of ownership in a district implies a statistically significant fall in the 
employment rate by about 0.35 percentage points. This negative effect declines in the 
fraction of high-skilled in a district. Our results underscore the importance of controlling for 
unobserved district-specific fixed effects and common time effects, and of appropriately 
dealing with endogeneity.  
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1. Introduction 
Throughout recent history, governments in many countries have encouraged 
homeownership. Ownership is seen as a secure way for the population to accumulate assets. 
Moreover, ownership generates significant social benefits. Owners are more likely to have 
long residence spells, which contributes to local neighbourhood stability and to the 
accumulation of social capital (DiPasquale and Glaeser, 1999; Rohe et al., 2002; Dietz and 
Haurin, 2003; Engelhardt et al., 2010). Renters do not bring about the same returns due to 
their higher degree of geographical mobility. From a labour market perspective, however, 
rising degrees of homeownership are much more controversial. Homeownership may 
restrict geographical mobility, and imply inferior labour market outcomes, both for the 
individual and in the aggregate. Oswald (1996, 1997a,b,c) was among the first to advance 
this argument. If demand for labour falls in a region, homeowners will be less inclined to 
move to more prosperous regions mainly due to high costs of selling and buying homes. 
Renters by contrast can move at much lower cost. In equilibrium, higher degrees of 
homeownership imply higher unemployment. Empirically, Oswald’s evidence in favour of his 
hypothesis relies mainly on cross country macroeconomic data, and on aggregate data for 
regions within individual countries. Oswald (1996) observed higher unemployment rates in 
OECD countries with a higher fraction of owners (versus renters). Also, he found that since 
the 1970s the unemployment rate increased most in those countries with the strongest 
growth in the rate of ownership. According to his results, an increase of the rate of 
ownership with 10 percentage points causes an increase of the unemployment rate with 2 
percentage points. 
The Oswald hypothesis has provoked a large body of theoretical and empirical work. Coulson 
and Fisher (2009) show in a survey that a change of theoretical assumptions may generate 
results that differ from Oswald’s, both for individual homeowners and for the aggregate 
labour market. Empirically, a wave of studies has not settled the issue, although it may be 
possible to observe some structure in the results. Studies using microeconomic data very 
often challenge the Oswald hypothesis, and find homeowners to have better employment 
positions (e.g. Coulson and Fisher, 2002, 2009; Robson, 2003; van Leuvensteijn and Koning, 
2004; Munch et al., 2006, 2008). Studies using macroeconomic data are more often in line 
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with Oswald (e.g. Partridge and Rickman, 1997; Pehkonen, 1997; Nickell, 1998; Nickell et al. 
2005; Cochrane and Poot, 2007), although various researchers obtain dissident or 
insignificant results (Flatau et al., 2002; Barrios García and Rodríguez Hernández, 2004, 
Coulson and Fisher, 2009). Overall, it is difficult however to draw convincing conclusions 
from these macro studies due to their imperfect or limited econometric setup. 
This paper tests the Oswald hypothesis in a panel of 42 Belgian districts (‘arrondissements’) 
since the 1970s
1
. Along the time dimension we have data for six years between 1970 and 
2005. Our dependent variable is the employment rate, the fraction of working age 
population with a job. Our approach and data availability are such that this may be the first 
paper to avoid three limitations in existing empirical macro studies. First, many macro 
studies lack data along the time dimension, which makes it impossible to control for 
unobserved fixed effects, and which may lead to seriously biased estimates. The availability 
of data since the 1970s enables us to control for fixed effects. Moreover, it allows us to 
include in this study the periods with most labour market turbulence since the Second World 
War, and to embed the Oswald hypothesis in a broader model including various other 
determinants of employment like labour costs and productivity, skill level of the population 
and demographic variables. If the time dimension is short, and data availability limited, it 
clearly becomes difficult to estimate the effects of only slowly changing variables like the 
rate of ownership, the skill level, and demography. Only Oswald (1996, 1997a, 1997b), 
Partridge and Rickman (1997), Green and Hendershott (2001) and Nickell et al. (2005) exploit 
data for the 1970s and the 1980s. Second, most existing macro studies neglect the possibility 
of reverse causality. Yet, due to the potential influence of employment in a region on 
permanent income and tenure choice of households in that region, ownership may be 
endogenous to changes (shocks) in employment. If not dealt with, positive correlation 
between shocks to employment and the rate of ownership may bias the estimated Oswald 
effect upwards. Empirically, this would impose the use of IV techniques. We employ these in 
this paper. Barrios García and Rodríguez Hernández (2004), Cochrane and Poot (2007) and 
Coulson and Fisher (2009) are the only studies we know to have used IV-methods before. 
Third, observing the Oswald effect is (only) one thing. Another may be to understand what 
determines its size, and economic significance. Our relatively large panel along both the 
                                                          
1
 Appendix A contains a map and some more information on these districts. 
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cross-sectional and time dimension allows us to test various interaction effects which may 
shed light on this. We test the role of structural geographic and schooling related variables. 
Among these variables are the proximity of a border (country or language border), 
population density, the skill level of the population, etc.  
Our main findings are as follows. We find evidence confirming Oswald’s hypothesis for 
Belgium. We observe that a 1 percentage point rise in the rate of homeownership in a 
district implies a statistically (and economically) significant fall in the employment rate by 
about 0.35 percentage points. Our results show the importance of controlling for both cross-
sectional fixed effects and common time effects. If we do not do this, the estimated Oswald 
effect can be totally different, highly insignificant, close to zero and sometimes even 
positive. Our results also demonstrate that the estimated Oswald effect may be biased when 
endogeneity of homeownership is disregarded. Not using IV techniques, we find a much 
smaller (less negative) Oswald effect. As to the determinants of the size of the Oswald effect, 
we find that it falls in the fraction of high skilled in a district. We also obtain indicative results 
that the Oswald effect may be stronger in districts closer to borders, and in districts farther 
away from major cities and centres of economic activity, but these findings are not 
statistically significant.  
Our main result in favour of Oswald’s hypothesis survives various robustness checks. 
These concern changes in the imposed functional form of the relationship between 
ownership and employment, changes in our panel along the time dimension, and changes in 
the dependent variable. Changing our focus to unemployment rather than employment, 
does not affect our main conclusion. 
Among our other results, we observe negative effects on the employment rate in a 
district of the ratio of wage costs to productivity, and (insignificant) positive effects of the 
fraction of high skilled. We also see a (time-varying) influence of some demographic 
variables, like the age structure of the population. Often, however, this influence is not 
statistically significant either.  
In the following section of the paper we briefly review the existing theoretical and empirical 
literature on the relationship between housing and jobs. The third section describes our 
econometric model. Our analysis of equilibrium employment is situated within the New 
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Keynesian competing claims approach developed mainly by Layard et al. (1991). Here we 
also take into account specific characteristics of wage setting in Belgium. To define 
instruments for the rate of homeownership in the employment regression we build on the 
literature on tenure choice initiated by Rosen (1979) and Rosen and Rosen (1980). The 
fourth section describes our dataset. The fifth section presents the results of our 
econometric analysis. We summarize our main findings in the final section. 
2. Homeownership and employment: a brief review of the 
literature 
(Un)employment rates differ widely across regions in most countries, including Belgium. 
Geographical mobility can be a vigorous instrument to eliminate these differences by shifting 
labour supply from high to low unemployment regions. Theoretically, higher wages or a 
higher probability to find a (suitable) job in prosperous areas could bring about this shift. 
Empirical evidence shows that the latter is the most important motivation for workers to be 
mobile (Blanchard and Katz, 1992; Böheim and Taylor, 2002). However, whether an 
economic agent decides to work in another region depends not only on expected benefits. 
Moving also generates costs: search and transaction costs when selling and buying a house, 
commuting costs, costs to overcome cultural or language barriers, personal costs when 
leaving familiar surroundings, etc.  
Oswald (1996, 1997a,b,c) emphasizes the negative effects of homeownership on 
geographical mobility and labour market performance. Oswald (1997c) describes a perfectly 
competitive economy with two separate locations that are joined by a road. People have to 
live in one of them, either as owner or as renter. Each location experiences real shocks to 
labour demand. Tenure choice is made before these shocks are revealed. When their region 
is hit by a bad shock, renters can move to the other region at no cost. Owners in the bad 
region either remain unemployed and accept unemployment benefits, commute to the 
better region at a commuting cost, or pay a fixed (high) transaction cost and move. The 
commuting cost rises in the number of commuters. At some number of commuters this cost 
becomes equal to the transaction cost of moving. Due to commuting or moving costs, 
owners will have a higher reservation wage for jobs in the other location. As a result, labour 
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supply to each location is horizontal at a low level of wages up to the number of owners in 
that location and the total number of renters in the economy
2
. It then becomes upward 
sloping as higher wages will be necessary to induce (rising numbers of) owners from the 
other location to commute. Labour supply becomes horizontal again when commuting costs 
have risen to the level of the transaction cost of moving. Everyone is willing to work in a 
good region at a wage that covers both the unemployment benefit and moving costs. In the 
end the position of the labour demand curve determines equilibrium quantities and wages. 
Given the competitive nature of the labour market, owners and renters receive the same 
wage offers. Due to their higher reservation wage at distant jobs, however, owners are more 
likely to be unemployed. Renters are fully employed. Furthermore, at the aggregate level, 
higher degrees of homeownership imply a leftward shift of the upward sloping part of the 
labour supply curve. Lower equilibrium employment, higher unemployment and higher 
wages are the result. 
Oswald’s arguments may be strengthened by a number of complementary 
considerations. First, if long distance commuting contributes to traffic congestion, overall 
production costs may rise, which further undermines employment. Hymel (2009) provides 
empirical proof of congestion damping employment growth in U.S. metropolitan areas. 
Furthermore, if the overall promotion of homeownership undermines the development of a 
well-functioning rental market, it will also be more difficult for unemployed renters to move 
to other regions (Oswald, 1999). Traffic congestion and a tight rental market imply that the 
disadvantages of homeownership are not necessarily concentrated in the segment of 
owners. 
Nickell (1998) and Nickell and Layard (1999) embed Oswald’s argument in an 
imperfectly competitive macro model of the labour market. In this model equilibrium 
(un)employment reconciles competing claims of wage and price setters. Any factor which 
raises targeted price or wage mark-ups will imply higher equilibrium unemployment. An 
important determinant of the price mark-up is the degree of product market competition. 
Wage mark-ups depend on the unemployment benefit system, union power and the 
characteristics of wage bargaining, labour taxes, etc. Ownership is important in this setup as 
a determinant of wage pressure. Following Oswald, rising rates of ownership imply reduced 
                                                          
2
 This low level equals the level of the unemployment benefit (or the value of leisure).  
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mobility and search effectiveness among the unemployed. The employed can then claim a 
higher wage mark-up. Ownership may also raise the mark-up of prices on wages because 
non-wage costs may rise: hiring costs (if it becomes more difficult to fill in vacancies), 
congestion costs, etc. Overall, equilibrium employment will fall. 
More recent theoretical work has reconsidered and/or extended Oswald’s assumptions and 
conclusions. Dohmen (2005) basically confirms Oswald’s results but emphasizes the role of 
education and skills. Workers only move to another region in Dohmen’s model when the 
wage in that region exceeds the unemployment benefit and the cost of changing location. 
Since the latter cost is higher for homeowners, owners will be less mobile and face higher 
unemployment, as in Oswald. Rising ownership rates then go along with inferior labour 
market performance. Skill differences may however disturb this simple pattern. High skilled 
workers earn high wages, which exceed the unemployment benefit plus relocation cost. As a 
consequence, the skilled may both be owner and mobile. Their mobility raises their chances 
to find a job. The low skilled, however, earn wages below the sum of the unemployment 
benefit and the cost of changing location. As a consequence, when a low skilled owner loses 
his job, he will not move, and remain unemployed. Low skilled renters by contrast remain 
mobile. The implication of Dohmen’s model for empirical work is important. When testing 
the relationship between ownership and labour market outcomes, it is crucial to control for 
skill levels, i.e. to keep skills constant in the regression. Furthermore, above a certain skill 
level, there need not be any relationship between ownership and employment.  
Munch et al. (2006) raise another argument which may undermine the Oswald 
hypothesis. Due to high costs of moving, owners will not only have a higher reservation 
wage for distant jobs, they will also have a lower reservation wage for local jobs. It is 
therefore possible that rising ownership goes along with higher employment, but then this 
should be at lower wages. Brunet and Havet (2009) confirm this idea for French workers. 
Homeowners in their study are more wage downgraded (and feel more overeducated) than 
renters. In line with this, Rouwendal and Nijkamp (2010) find empirical prove for lower 
geographical mobility of homeowners but also for higher exit rates from unemployment. The 
latter is due to more intensive search activity and faster acceptance of jobs on the local 
labour market, especially by highly leveraged owners. Munch et al. (2008) add that increased 
willingness to accept local jobs need not imply lower actual wages. Immobility may cause 
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owners to invest more in their local jobs, increasing firm-specific productivity. The 
establishment of a long-term employment relationship may also raise the incentive for firms 
to train their workers-owners.  
Coulson and Fisher (2009) discuss the Oswald hypothesis within a model of search 
and bargaining in the style of Pissarides (1990). Owners face higher unemployment than 
renters in this model because they search on a smaller scale. Because their search is 
narrower, owners have less bargaining power, which implies that firms can make them work 
at lower wages. The latter effect is important because it implies that an aggregate rise in 
ownership reduces expected wages and raises expected profits for firms. Higher expected 
profits may cause new firms to enter. Under certain assumptions this favourable entry effect 
may dominate the unfavourable (standard) composition effect according to which an 
increase in the number of (immobile) owners undermines overall labour market 
performance. 
Theoretical ambiguity underscores the relevance of empirical work on the Oswald 
hypothesis. Empirical studies do not settle the issue, however, certainly not when it comes 
to aggregate effects. Among studies that make use of micro data one can observe some 
degree of consensus. Most of these studies find homeowners to have a better employment 
status than renters (see e.g. Coulson and Fisher, 2002, 2009, for the US; Robson, 2003, for 
the UK; van Leuvensteijn and Koning, 2004, for the Netherlands; Munch et al., 2006, 2008, 
for Denmark). Owners are in general less mobile than private renters (Caldera Sánchez and 
Andrews, 2011). However, when they lose their job, this does not necessarily imply longer 
unemployment spells. Battu et al. (2008) observe similar unemployment durations for 
homeowners and private renters in the UK. Munch et al. (2006) find homeowners in 
Denmark to have even shorter unemployment spells due to a lower reservation wage to 
local jobs. 
Empirical studies using macro data cannot confirm the message emanating from the (more 
or less) micro consensus. Many macro studies confirm the Oswald hypothesis that a rise in 
the rate of homeownership goes along with inferior labour market results (see Table 1 for an 
overview). The question is how strong and robust this finding is. On the one hand, a 
contradiction between micro and macro findings is perfectly possible. As we have mentioned 
before, rising degrees of homeownership may cause negative effects (congestion, tightening 
  
  
 
Study Regions or countries (# cross-sections) Time dimension Methodology Oswald? 
  US states (51) 
UK regions (13) 
1986-95, annual 
1973-94, annual 
Panel data. Fixed Effects OLS with time dummies. Bivariate (+ lags), levels yes 
Oswald (1996) 
  
regions within France (22), Italy (20) and 
Sweden (8) 
1990s (1 observation) Correlation between levels in unemployment and ownership, bivariate yes 
  
cross-section of countries (11, 18) 
1960s (1 observation), 
1990s (1 observation) 
Correlation between levels in unemployment and ownership, bivariate yes 
Oswald (1997a) US states (51) 
change between 1970s 
and 1990s (1 observation) 
Correlation between changes in unemployment and ownership, bivariate yes 
Oswald (1997b) regions within OECD countries 1990s (1 observation) Correlation between levels in unemployment and ownership, bivariate yes (a) 
Partridge and Rickman (1997) US states (48) 1972-1991, annual 
Panel data. Pooled OLS / Fixed Effects OLS with year dummies, 
multivariate 
yes 
Pehkonen (1997) regions within Finland (13) 1991 (1 observation) OLS, bivariate, multivariate yes (b) 
Nickell (1998) OECD countries (20) 
Mid 1980s and early 1990s 
(1 observation per period) 
Panel data. Random Effects GLS, multivariate yes 
Hassink en Kurvers (2000) 
regions within the Netherlands (COROP) 
(40) 
1990-1998, annual 
Panel data. Pooled OLS / Fixed Effects OLS, deterministic time trend. 
Bivariate (+ lags), levels 
no 
Green and Herdershott (2001) US states (51) 
change between 1970 and 
1990 (1 observation) 
Bivariate regression, WLS, different unemployment rates (age groups) 
yes/no 
(c) 
Flatau et al. (2002) Regions (LGA) within Australia (590) 
1986, 1991, 1996, 2001 (4 
observations) 
Multivariate regression, WLS, separate regressions per year no 
Glaeser and Shapiro (2003) US Metropolitan Statistical Areas 1998 (1 observation) Correlation between levels in unemployment and ownership, bivariate no 
Barrios García and Rodríguez 
Hernández (2004) 
regions within Spain (46) 1991 (1 observation) 
Cross section. Multivariate, Simultaneous equation system explaining 
unemployment and home ownership, 3SLS 
no 
Nickell et al. (2005) OECD countries (19) 1961-1995, annual Panel data. Fixed Effects GLS with year dummies, multivariate yes 
Bassanini and Duval (2006) OECD countries (21) 1982-2003 (1 observation) 
Bivariate regression on the fixed country effect in a panel study of 
unemployment on home ownership 
yes 
Cochrane and Poot (2007) regions within New Zealand (58) 
1986, 1991, 1996, 2001 (4 
observations) 
Panel data. Pooled OLS / Fixed Effects OLS / Hausman Taylor estimator. 
Multivariate 
yes 
Coulson and Fisher (2009) US Metropolitan Statistical Areas 1990 (1 observation) OLS and 2SLS, multivariate no 
Lerbs (2011) regions within Germany (87) 
1998, 2002 and 2006 (3 
observations) 
Separate regressions per year (OLS), Panel data: pooled OLS, Fixed Effects 
OLS 
yes/no 
(d) 
Notes: 
(a) except for Belgium, the Netherlands and West Germany 
(b) significant only in the bivariate case 
(c) no for young and older households, yes for middle aged 
(d) no for OLS and pooled OLS, yes for Fixed Effects 
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of rental markets, bargained wage pressure,…) beyond the owners themselves. Even if they 
are not worse off, aggregate labour market performance may be weaker. Clearly, the 
aggregate story is important for policy makers. On the other hand, many macro studies may 
be challenged on methodological grounds. Our summary in Table 1 reveals that many 
studies have only one observation along the time dimension which makes it impossible to 
control for fixed regional/country effects. This also makes it more difficult to embed the 
Oswald hypothesis in a broader model explaining (un)employment, where also differences in 
wages and productivity, skills, demography, etc. have their role. Furthermore, only Barrios 
García and Rodríguez Hernández (2004), Cochrane and Poot (2007) and Coulson and Fisher 
(2009) control for endogeneity of homeownership by means of IV methods. Yet, both 
theoretically and empirically, housing tenure choices have been found to be determined also 
by one’s employment prospects and permanent income (e.g. Rosen and Rosen, 1980; 
Henley, 1998; van Leuvensteijn and Koning, 2004). Neglecting the possibility of reverse 
causality could bias the estimates. In the next sections we try to overcome these limitations 
in an empirical macro study for Belgium.  
3. Econometric model and methodology 
We now discuss our empirical specification for the employment rate and some 
methodological considerations, which guide our analysis in the next sections. We define the 
employment rate as the fraction of all people at working age living in a district who have a 
job.
 
Our setup is mainly inspired by Layard et al. (1991) and Nickell and Layard (1999). Their 
approach to model the determination of wages and employment corresponds most closely 
to the Belgian situation. We rely on Oswald (1997c) and some of the literature that we 
summarized in the previous section when it comes to the effects of changes in ownership on 
employment. 
3.1 Empirical specification 
Starting point of our discussion is Figure 1, describing the labour market and the 
determination of the equilibrium number of jobs in district i. The latter is obviously a key 
determinant of the employment rate among the people at working age living there. It need 
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not be the same, however, since people may commute to work in a different district. The 
equilibrium number of jobs in the district (Li) is determined at the intersection of the labour 
demand curve (Ldi) and the wage setting curve (WSi). Labour demand falls in the real wage 
per worker (wagei), including taxes on labour. For a given real wage, labour demand is 
negatively affected by real non-wage production costs (nwci) and positively by labour 
productivity (qi). Business cycle and other aggregate labour demand shocks are captured by 
bc, district-specific demand shocks by εdi. The wage setting curve (WSi) indicates bargained 
real wages. It is flat since wages in a district are only very weakly affected by local 
employment conditions. Wages in Belgium are mainly bargained at the sectoral level, often 
within a nationally imposed range. The coverage rate of collective bargaining exceeds 90% 
(OECD, 2004). Wages will therefore mainly reflect sectoral and national variables, like 
sectoral or aggregate labour productivity (q) and overall wage push variables (X). The latter 
include union power, unemployment benefits, the tax wedge, etc. As mentioned before, 
Nickell (1998), Nickell and Layard (1999) and Nickell et al. (2005) also see a role for aggregate 
ownership here. The role for local factors shifting the WS-curve (εwi) will be very small. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Employment (number of jobs) and wages at the district level 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
     WSi (q, X, εwi) 
            Li Li 
 
wage i 
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Equation (1) puts these theoretical considerations into a workable econometric specification 
for the employment rate in district i and year t. As we indicated below the equation, our 
dataset contains observations for 42 districts over 6 years between 1970 and 2005 (see next 
section). 
 
         Emplit  = δi + γ1 OWNit + γ2 Schoolingit + γ3 log(wageit) + γ4 log(qit)  + γ5 Age1524it  
+ γ6 Age5564it + γ7 DFlanders90it  +  λt + υit         (1) 
               with : 1,..., 42;i =   1970,  1977,  1981,  1991,  2001,  2005.t =   
 
The parameters γ3 and γ4 measure the effects on the employment rate in percentage points 
of a 1 percent increase in the real wage (wageit) and labour productivity (qit) respectively. 
We expect γ3 to be negative and γ4 to be positive. The main reasons to have the rate of 
ownership (OWNit) in Equation (1) – for given wages and productivity – follow from our 
discussion in the second section. They are as follows. First, ownership may affect non-wage 
labour costs for firms in a district (nwcit) due to an increase in traffic and congestion costs. 
Labour demand may shift to the left. Second, the rate of ownership may affect the 
reservation wage, search intensity and overall mobility of inhabitants in the district. Owners 
may have a lower reservation wage, and search more intensively, for local jobs. Given the 
nature of wage bargaining in Belgium, the influence on wages is likely to be very small. The 
probability for firms to fill vacancies, however, may rise, which brings down non-wage labour 
costs (hiring costs), and promotes employment. The third effect of ownership concerns the 
employment rate (Emplit) for a given number of jobs in the district (Lit). As argued by Oswald 
(1997c), owners also have a higher reservation wage for distant jobs. For a given level of 
wages in other districts, they may therefore have a higher probability than renters to be 
unemployed. The aggregate employment rate in their own district will then fall, as a smaller 
fraction of the population will have a job. Which of all these effects from ownership is 
dominant, and therefore the sign of γ1, remains an empirical issue. 
Other determinants of the employment rate in Equation (1) are the skill level of the 
population (Schoolingit), two demographic variables (Age1524it, Age5564it) and a separate 
dummy for all districts in one region (Flanders) since 1990 (DFlanders90it). As we explain 
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below, we measure the skill level by the fraction of people with a tertiary degree. 
Productivity already being controlled for by including qit, ‘Schooling’ mainly captures the idea 
raised by Dohmen (2005). For a given share of owners in a district, overall mobility of the 
population and expected employment rates will rise when skill levels are higher. High skilled 
workers are better able to bear commuting costs, for example. As demographic variables we 
consider the share of two specific age groups among the population. Our selection of groups 
reflects well-known differences (in all OECD countries) in labour market participation and1 
unemployment rates among young, prime-age and older workers. We expect the2 
employment rate in a district to be lower when the fractions of the youngest people (age 15-
24) and the older people at working age (age 55-64) rise, implying negative signs for γ5 and 
γ63. 
The introduction of a separate Flemish regional dummy since 1990 (DFlanders90) 
captures the possible effects from constitutional reform in Belgium. Since the end of the 
1980s the Flemish and Walloon regions have gained much more autonomy in the area of 
economic policy, including important aspects of labour market policy (e.g. public 
employment services and training of the unemployed). The parameter γ7 measures 
differential effects for all districts in the Flemish region. Finally, we control for district-
specific fixed effects (δi) and common time effects (λt). The latter capture the effects of 
common labour demand shocks (e.g. aggregate business cycle effects, oil shocks). 
Idiosyncratic shocks will show up in
 
 υit. 
Next to its basic specification, we estimate in the fifth section two extended versions of 
Equation (1). In a first extension, we allow for time variation in the effects of the 
demographic age groups. Extension of compulsory education from the age of 14 to 18 in 
Belgium since 1983 for example may induce lower employment for a given demographic 
structure. Employment rates may also be affected when preference for leisure or non-
employment benefit regimes evolve differently across age groups. In this respect, the 
increased possibility to retire early since the end of the 1970s may explain lower 
employment rates among older workers in the second half of our period of study. Our 
second extension aims to shed more light on the determinants of the size of the Oswald 
                                                          
1
   
2
   
3
 Note though that these expectations are unconditional. Controlling for (tertiary) schooling, and wages and 
productivity, expected signs may be less straightforward.  
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effect. To that aim we introduce in Equation (1) a number of interaction terms 
γ11 VAR*OWNit, where VAR is a variable that may affect the size of the Oswald effect. This 
variable may vary along the time dimension or the cross-sectional dimension. Variables that 
we have in mind are the skill level of the population, population density, the proximity of a 
country or language border, and the proximity of a major centre of economic activity.  
3.2 Methodological considerations 
Methodologically, it is obvious from Figure 1 and from the literature on the determinants of 
ownership that instrumental variables techniques will be necessary to estimate Equation (1). 
Figure 1 reveals the endogeneity of real wages in a district to district-specific shocks in 
labour demand. Positive shocks will push up wages, and induce correlation between υit and 
wageit. Given the above mentioned characteristics of wage formation in Belgium, reflected in 
the flat slope of the WS-curve, this kind of endogeneity is most likely very small, but it will 
not be zero. Furthermore, any labour demand shock affecting employment and the error 
term in Equation (1) may also feed through in district-specific productivity qit. As to 
ownership, its endogeneity is clear from work on tenure choice by e.g. Rosen (1979) and 
Rosen and Rosen (1980). Micro tenure choice is commonly modelled as a function of the 
relative cost of living as an owner versus living as a renter, household permanent income, 
and a number of social and demographic characteristics of the household. The employment 
situation being a key determinant of permanent income, the proportion of homeowners in 
the population is logically affected by the (un)employment rate (see also Di Salvo and 
Ermisch, 1997; Barrios García and Rodríguez Hernández, 2004). Finally, also ‘Schooling’ may 
be endogenous to shocks in employment. The literature for example provides ample 
empirical evidence that schooling is counter-cyclical (e.g. DeJong and Ingram, 2001; Heylen 
and Pozzi, 2007). Positive shocks to employment may pull young people out of education 
and into work, and vice versa. We discuss our choice of instruments in the fifth section. 
Another methodological issue follows from the spatial dimension of our dataset and the 
possibility of spatial autocorrelation. If significant, we would need to take this into account in 
our estimation. To test for spatial effects, we computed Geary’s C statistic on the dependent 
31 
 
variable as well as on the residuals for each single year t. We could not reject the null 
hypothesis of no spatial autocorrelation
4
. 
4. Data 
We use macro data at the level of Belgian districts. Because of some difficulties in data 
consistency, and because of its different nature, we have omitted the Brussels district. This 
leaves us with 42 cross-sections, 22 in Flanders and 20 in the Walloon Region (see Appendix 
A). As to the time dimension, we are limited to the years in which a census or a large-scale 
survey has taken place. The years in our database are 1970, 1977, 1981, 1991, 2001 and 
2005. Since in 2005 the survey only took place in Flanders, we are left with a panel of 232 
observations. In this section we describe our data. We summarize the main descriptive 
statistics of all variables in Table 2. 
Figures 2 to 5 show the evolution of important variables graphically. To bring some structure 
- it is not practical to show data for all 42 districts - we select those Flemish and Walloon 
districts that are at the 20th, the 50th and the 80th percentile when ranked from low to high 
according to the change in the employment rate since 1970. So, these are relatively weak, 
median and relatively strong performers when it comes to change in the employment rate. 
In Flanders these districts are respectively Gent, Turnhout and Brugge, in Wallonia Tournai, 
Nivelles and Waremme. For a detailed description of the construction of our data and their 
sources, we refer to Appendix B.  
Figure 2 shows the evolution of the employment rate. We observe a fall in about all districts 
during the 1970s. In Wallonia employment continues to decline on average during the 
1980s, whereas in Flanders it then recovers. During the 1990s and 2000s most Belgian 
districts show rising employment rates. Figure 3 depicts the evolution of the rate of 
homeownership. This rate represents the fraction of houses that are occupied by their 
owner. The remaining fraction is occupied by renters. We observe a gradual increase in 
                                                          
4
 None of the values for Geary’s C that we obtain, differ significantly from 1 (p-values are always above 0.25). In 
the same spirit, we also tested for temporal autocorrelation in the residuals. Since our panel data are unequally 
spaced along the time dimension, we relied on the non-parametric Runs test. Here also, test results could 
never reject the null hypothesis of no autocorrelation. Details on all these tests are available upon request. 
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ownership in about all districts, although the size of this increase clearly differs across 
districts. As to skill levels (Schooling) we were able to detract from the censuses the 
population of age 14 and older that has terminated school, sorted by their highest diploma. 
For our regressions we use the number of highly skilled people, i.e. people with tertiary 
education, in percent of the population of 14 and older. Figure 4 shows the data for the six 
districts that we focus on. We observe a rise in each of them. Compared to other variables, 
differences across districts are quite small for this variable. The data that we report in Table 
2 show that, relative to the within standard deviation, the between standard deviation is the 
smallest for Schooling. 
Table  2. Main descriptive statistics of the variables 
Source: see Appendix B. Note that the data for OWN in 2005 only include Flemish districts. 
  
 
EMPL OWN SCHOOLING WAGE PRODUCTIVITY (q) WAGE GAP AGE1524 AGE2554 AGE5564 
Overall Mean 57.2% 69.7% 14.5% 1.505 1.286 1.198 14.3% 39.5% 10.8% 
Minimum 44.0% 44.3% 5.3% 0.698 0.601 0.891 10.7% 32.7% 7.1% 
First quartile 54.0% 64.7% 9.0% 1.279 0.963 1.100 12.6% 37.2% 10.3% 
Median 56.8% 70.8% 12.5% 1.582 1.175 1.191 14.5% 39.5% 11.0% 
Third quartile 60.0% 75.5% 20.0% 1.766 1.528 1.346 15.7% 41.7% 11.4% 
Maximum 70.4% 83.3% 38.7% 2.298 2.424 1.518 20.6% 45.0% 14.9% 
Std. Dev. 4.8% 7.8% 6.7% 0.381 0.413 0.160 1.9% 2.9% 1.0% 
Between Std. Dev. 3.6% 6.7% 2.5% 0.156 0.214 0.121 1.8% 2.7% 0.7% 
Within Std. Dev. 3.2% 4.1% 6.2% 0.348 0.354 0.106 0.7% 1.1% 0.7% 
1970 mean 56.6% 63.8% 8.3% 0.882 0.803 1.108 14.0% 39.3% 11.0% 
1977 mean 55.2% 68.8% 9.2% 1.320 1.012 1.319 14.5% 39.2% 10.9% 
1981 mean 54.4% 68.4% 9.7% 1.433 1.095 1.320 14.7% 39.5% 10.5% 
1991 mean 55.7% 71.2% 14.9% 1.663 1.405 1.198 14.4% 39.9% 10.8% 
2001 mean 59.4% 72.9% 21.2% 1.857 1.654 1.146 14.0% 40.0% 11.0% 
2005 mean 61.9% 75.7% 23.7% 1.876 1.746 1.099 14.4% 39.2% 10.7% 
Observations 252 232 252 252 252 252 252 252 252 
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Figure2. Employment rate among 15-64 year olds living in the district (Empl)  
 
Source: Appendix B.  
Figure 3. Homeownership rates (OWN)  
  
Source: Appendix B. 
The wage gap in Figure 5 reflects the evolution of wage costs relative to productivity, i.e. 
wageit/qit. More precisely, it has been computed as the ratio of real compensation per 
employee (including taxes on labour) to a proxy for real productivity per employee
5
. Our 
                                                          
5
 Due to lack of data at the level of individual districts in the 1970s, our wage and productivity data have been 
computed at the provincial level. Provinces include about 4 districts on average (see Appendix A).  
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proxy is real GDP per capita. We prefer this variable above output per employee. The latter 
is highly endogenous, which may disturb appropriate measurement of the wage gap. A 
simple example can be illuminating. If wage increases are excessive, pushing up the wage 
gap, firms may respond by laying off the least productive workers and by substituting capital 
for labour. As a result, output per (remaining) worker may rise, and the wage gap may fall 
again. In the end, even if there is a serious problem of job losses, the wage gap may reveal 
nothing. Employing GDP per capita as a productivity measure makes the wage gap much less 
vulnerable to this perverse mechanism. Our data in Table 2 and Figure 5 are to be 
interpreted as an index, compared to a benchmark wage gap. As benchmark we chose the 
wage gap in the whole of Belgium in 1970. The data clearly show a derailment of wage costs 
in the seventies. During the eighties the wage gap is strongly reduced in Flanders, mainly 
thanks to higher productivity growth, with comparable wage growth. The wage gap remains 
much higher in Walloon districts. Wages have not followed (downwards) the weaker 
evolution of productivity. The data in Table 2 confirm that relative to the within standard 
deviation, the variation across districts (between standard deviation) is much smaller for the 
wage level than for productivity. A final series of variables in Table 2 are demographic. We 
report the share of three age groups in total population: the fraction of people aged 15 to 
24, people aged 25 to 54, and people aged 55 to 64. 
Figure 4. The percentage of highly skilled people (14-... years old) (Schooling) 
  
Source: Appendix B. 
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Figure 5. Wage gap (index, Belgium 1970 = 1) 
 
Source: Appendix B. 
5. Econometric analysis and results 
This section contains our main estimation results. In line with earlier arguments, we estimate 
Equation (1) using the 2SLS estimation method. Endogenous variables to be instrumented 
are the rate of ownership, schooling, the wage level and productivity. As a result of the 
endogeneity of wages and productivity, also the wage gap is endogenous. Since the 
coefficients γ3 and γ4 of the log wage level and log productivity are never significantly 
different from each other in absolute value, we concentrate in this section on results using 
the log wage gap
6
. The latter comes down to imposing in Equation (1) the restriction that 
γ3 = - γ4. 
5.1 Instrumental variables 
Good instruments should have explanatory power for the variable to be instrumented and 
be uncorrelated to shocks υit in the employment rate in the individual district.  
                                                          
6
 Estimating γ3 and γ4 separately always yields a value for γ4 close to 0.25 and highly significant, while γ3 is 
always negative but very imprecisely estimated (estimated t-value < 1). The value of γ3 is never significantly 
different from -0.25.  
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When it comes to instrumenting real wages and productivity in individual districts, 
and therefore the wage gap, it is our hypothesis that the ‘aggregate’ regional counterparts of 
these variables contain key information on exogenous drivers, without being affected to any 
important extent by district-specific shocks. For Flemish districts these aggregate regional 
variables are averages over all 22 districts in Flanders. For Walloon districts we use averages 
over all 20 districts in Wallonia. Although the cross-sectional variation of these aggregate 
regional variables is very small, they are fully time-varying. Aggregate real wages for example 
will reflect changes in wage push variables like union power in key sectors in the region, 
taxation, and (aggregate regional) labour market policies. Aggregate real wages should not 
seriously be affected by idiosyncratic labour demand and employment shocks in individual 
districts, which constitute no more than one twentieth of the regional aggregate. Aggregate 
variables may of course reflect common shocks across all districts, but due to the use of time 
dummies these common shocks will not show up in the error term.  
Next to the relevant regional aggregate, we include the length of the highway and 
county road network (in kilometres per km²) as an additional instrument for productivity in a 
district, and therefore the wage gap
7
. We call this instrument ‘infrastructure’. Highways and 
main roads being major elements of the infrastructure in an area, the causal link with 
productivity is obvious.  
For schooling in a district we define population density in that district as instrument. 
We rely on Boucekkine et al. (2007) who have shown that high(er) population density in an 
area promotes the enlargement of education facilities. More schools being nearby will then 
open the possibility to reach higher education levels for more people. Highly populated 
areas may also attract more public transport connecting people to higher education facilities 
at larger distance  
Finally, we specify four instruments for the rate of ownership in a district. A first one 
is the fraction of the population older than 35 (age35+). The literature has shown the 
explanatory power of various demographic variables for the rate of ownership (e.g. Rosen 
and Rosen, 1980; Barrios García and Rodríguez Hernández, 2004; Gwin and Ong, 2008). The 
fraction of the population older than 35 is expected to have a significant positive effect. 
                                                          
7
 Productivity data being available only at the provincial level (see footnote 4), our data for the road network 
also concern the province to which a district belongs. 
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People in this age group have generally more resources and higher preference to enter into 
long-term commitments than younger people. Our second and our third instrument are 
population density and its square. Population density acts as a proxy for urbanization. It has 
been shown in the literature that differences in urbanization contribute significantly to 
explain variation in the rate of homeownership. The relationship is negative (e.g. Fisher and 
Jaffe, 2003). The reason for also including squared population density, is to allow for non-
linearity in this relationship. Coulson and Fisher (2009) provide one explanation for this 
negative relationship when they point to the fact that owner-occupied dwellings tend to be 
single-family detached units, whereas rentals are more often in multifamily dwellings. The 
latter are much more frequent in urban areas with high population density. Our fourth 
instrument for the rate of ownership is a common time trend for the six districts to which 
the major Belgian cities (next to Brussels) belong. These districts are Antwerp, Ghent, 
Bruges, Charleroi, Liege and Namur. Corresponding cities all house more than 100.000 
people. This common time trend captures the differential positive effect on the rate of 
ownership in the biggest cities and their suburbs from various structural developments since 
the 1970s. These developments include rising land prices in less urbanized areas, increasing 
traffic and more frequent traffic jams on the main axes around big cities, rising rental costs 
in percent of disposable income, a fall in the age at which people buy their first own house 
combined with the relative preference of young people to live in bigger cities, and 
government policies (so called ’grootstedenbeleid’ since 1999) raising the attractiveness of 
living as owner in big cities (Vanneste et al., 2007; Vastmans and Buyst, 2011). These 
structural developments did not all take place simultaneously, but they contribute to 
explaining the stronger trend rise in the rate of ownership in the biggest cities and their 
suburbs over time
8
.  
To test the quality of our instruments, we first assessed their explanatory power in the first 
stage regression for the endogenous variable that they are expected to explain. All but one 
instruments show up statistically significant at 2%. All have the correct sign in these 
                                                          
8
 Note that the structural developments underlying this ‘major city time trend’ bear no relationship to the 
employment rate. Extending Equation (1) with this time trend yields a highly insignificant coefficient (t-value < 
0.7 in absolute value). This conclusion of insignificance holds for all instruments when added to our estimated 
employment equations. They do not matter for employment significantly beyond their influence on the 
endogenous variables in the regression. 
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regressions
9
. Table 3 summarizes for the endogenous real wage gap, schooling, and rate of 
ownership in a first row the list of their instruments and the corresponding first stage 
F-statistics. These test the null hypothesis that the instruments do not significantly enter the 
first stage regression. The values for the F-statistic that we obtain are always far above 
Staiger and Stock (1997)’s rule of thumb value of 10, supporting our instruments’ joint 
significance. A second F-statistic in the ‘all six instruments’ row is the F-value for the null that 
all instruments are irrelevant, including those that we selected for other endogenous 
variables. Again we obtain values above 10. Next to their explanatory power, we tested the 
instruments’ exogeneity. We report overidentification test statistics (J-statistics) for their 
validity at the bottom of Table 4. We can never reject the null hypothesis that the 
instruments are valid.  
Table 3. Instruments and instrument relevance 
Endogenous 
variable 
Set of instrumental variables 
First stage F - statistic testing the 
relevance of the instruments 
log real wage gap 
regional aggregate log real wage gap 
infrastructure 
21.5 
 all six instruments 10.3 
schooling population density 20.9 
 all six instruments 27.1 
ownership 
fraction of population older than 35 (age35+) 
time trend for districts of 6 major cities 
population density 
population density squared 
 
17.5 
 all six instruments 13.4 
Data sources and summary of descriptive statistics for the instruments: see Appendix B and Table B1. 
5.2 Basic estimation results 
To estimate our equations we use the fixed effects estimator. A Hausman test rejects the 
null hypothesis that the unobserved effects are uncorrelated with the explanatory variables. 
Column (1) in Table 4 contains estimation results for our basic Equation (1), still allowing 
  
                                                          
9
 Detailed results are available upon request. The exception is the fraction of people older than 35 in the first 
stage regression for ownership. It is significant at 11%. 
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Table 4. Estimation results for the employment rate (Equation 1) 
EMPLOYMENT 1 – 2SLS    2 – 2SLS    3 – 2SLS     2 - OLS   
Homeownership rate 
(OWN) 
-0.285(**) 
(0.17) 
-0.358(***) 
(0.08) 
-0.327(***) 
(0.08) 
 
-0.257(***) 
(0.04) 
Schooling 
-0.005 
(0.14) 
0.038 
(0.12) 
0.066 
(0.13) 
 
0.115 
(0.07) 
100*Log (wage) 
-0.114 
(0.22) 
- -  - 
100*Log (productivity) 
0.249(***) 
(0.08) 
- -  - 
100*Log (wage gap) - 
-0.225(***) 
(0.06) 
-0.235(***) 
(0.06) 
 
-0.130(***) 
(0.02) 
 
Fraction age 15-24  
 
Fraction age 15-24  
X Dummy1970-1989 
 
Fraction age 15-24  
X Dummy1990-2005 
 
-0.220 
(0.20) 
 
_ 
 
 
_ 
 
-0.185 
(0.19) 
 
_ 
 
 
_ 
 
 
- 
 
 
-0.132 
(0.19) 
 
-0.302 
(0.21) 
 
 
-0.177 
(0.18) 
 
_ 
 
 
_ 
 
Fraction age 55-64  
 
Fraction age 55-64  
X Dummy1970-1989 
 
Fraction age 55-64  
X Dummy1990-2005 
 
-0.278(*) 
(0.17) 
 
_ 
 
 
_ 
 
-0.276 
(0.17) 
 
_ 
 
 
_ 
 
- 
 
 
-0.210 
(0.19) 
 
-0.367 
(0.23) 
 
 
-0.249 
(0.16)  
 
_ 
 
 
_ 
Dummy Flanders 1990-
2005  
2.53(***) 
(0.72) 
2.37(***) 
(0.70) 
2.47(***) 
(0.71) 
 
3.05(***) 
(0.43) 
R-squared within 
R-squared between 
R-squared overall 
0.87 
0.25 
0.43 
0.87 
0.16 
0.37 
0.87 
0.18 
0.40 
 
0.88 
0.19 
0.44 
J-statistic (p-value) (a) 0.19 0.20 0.33  - 
Time dummies yes yes yes  yes 
District dummies yes yes yes  yes 
Number of observations 232 232 232  232 
Note: * (**) (***) indicates statistical significance at 10% (5%) (1%). Between brackets are estimated standard errors. 
(a) Sargan-Hansen J-test of overidentifying restrictions. The null hypothesis is that the overidentifying restrictions 
are correct. 
unrestricted γ3 and γ4 10. As we have mentioned before, γ3 emerges highly insignificant. 
Column (2) introduces the log real wage gap, and therefore imposes the restriction that 
γ3=-γ4. Our estimation results in columns (1) and (2) show significant negative effects from 
                                                          
10
 Instead of the aggregate regional real wage gap, we introduce aggregate regional productivity and aggregate 
regional wages as two separate instruments (next to infrastructure) to estimate this equation.
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the rate of ownership and highly insignificant effects from the fraction of highly educated 
(schooling). The effects from the real wage gap in column (2) are significantly negative. 
Furthermore, we find negative effects on the employment rate from the share of young and 
older people in the population, which confirms expectations, but these negative effects are 
not (or only weakly) significant. In column (3) we allow variation over time in the effects of 
these two demographic variables. In line with expectations formulated earlier, we observe 
that the negative effects are larger in the second part of the period that we study (1990-05) 
than in the first part (1970-89), but nothing is statistically significant here
11
. Finally, our 
results reveal a significant positive differential Flemish policy effect on the employment rate 
of a little more than 2 percentage points since 1990. The far right column (4) in Table 4 re-
estimates column (2) by the OLS method. 
Our results confirm the Oswald hypothesis. We find in columns (1) – (3) that a 1 percentage 
point rise in the rate of ownership in a district implies a significant fall in the employment 
rate in that district by about 0.3 to 0.35 percentage points. This effect is not only statistically 
significant, it is also important economically. Using the estimated coefficients in column (3) 
and the data in Table 2, one can compute for example that a one standard deviation rise in 
the wage gap implies a fall in the employment rate by about 3 percentage points. A one 
standard deviation rise in the rate of ownership may cause a fall in the employment rate by 
no less than 2.6 percentage points. These findings underscore the importance of housing 
and the arguments underlying the Oswald hypothesis for employment in Belgium. In this 
respect, our results are in line with earlier work by Estevão (2002) and OECD (2011). 
Investigating regional labour market disparities in Belgium, Estevão finds low labour 
migration, and concludes that “Belgians move too little”. He points at linguistic and cultural 
factors, a compressed wage structure and generous unemployment benefits to explain low 
mobility. Although our study is not about mobility, it would suggest a high rate of 
homeownership as another potential explanatory variable. OECD (2011) confirms the 
negative effect of homeownership on mobility. This OECD study also indicates Belgium as a 
country with very high transaction costs of buying and selling houses. 
                                                          
11
 Also including the fraction of prime age workers in the employment equation implied coefficients which were 
highly insignificant and almost zero for this age group.  
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Our results also underscore the importance of the estimation method and of controlling for 
cross-sectional fixed effects and common time effects, when testing the Oswald hypothesis. 
We observe in the far right column in Table 4 the bias that may follow from OLS estimation. 
Given the expected positive effect of the employment rate (as a determinant of permanent 
income) on ownership, it should be no surprise to observe a weaker Oswald effect when we 
do not control for endogeneity. Its estimated size falls by about 30 percent. Note, however, 
that this reduced Oswald effect is still significantly different from zero. This result 
demonstrates that our main conclusion in this paper is invariant to the estimation technique 
(IV, OLS). 
Table 5 contains estimation results where we do not control for cross-sectional fixed effects 
and/or common time effects. The estimation errors that occur here, are much more serious. 
As one can see, anything goes. If common time effects are not controlled for in column 
(2_b), the Oswald coefficient falls to a little more than 1/2 of its estimated value in Table 4
12
. 
Not controlling for district fixed effects in column (2_c) yields an estimated Oswald 
coefficient which is even slightly positive, although statistically insignificant. If we control 
neither for district fixed effects nor for common time effects in column (2_d), a positive and 
statistically significant coefficient of 0.096 shows up. 
Our results in Table 5 may also shed light on the (somewhat surprising) insignificance of 
schooling in Table 4. One explanation is that (in contrast to other variables) schooling shows 
a highly similar evolution over time in all districts. Even if this evolution is important for 
employment, its effects may at least partly be picked up by the common time dummies
13
. 
Dropping these time dummies in Table 5, but controlling for district fixed effects, yields a 
positive and highly significant schooling effect (see column 2_b). 
  
                                                          
12
 Imagine for example business cycle shocks. Positive shocks may raise both employment, aggregate wages, 
and household confidence and resources, and the ambition to become owner. If not controlled for in the 
regressions, such a shock will induce positive correlation between ownership and the error term, and bias 
upwards the estimated Oswald coefficient. 
13
 The estimated time dummies in Table 4, column (2), are respectively 4.3%, 3.3%, 1.9%, 5.0% en 7.3% in 1977, 
1981, 1991, 2001 and 2005. 
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Table 5. Additional estimation results for the employment rate  
EMPLOYMENT 2_b  - 2SLS  2_c – 2SLS  2_d – 2SLS   
Homeownership rate 
(OWN) 
-0.188(**) 
(0.09) 
0.045 
(0.07) 
0.096(*) 
(0.05) 
Schooling 
0.246(***) 
(0.06) 
-0.823(*) 
(0.44) 
0.078 
(0.08) 
100*Log (wage gap) 
-0.146(***) 
(0.03) 
-0.022 
(0.07) 
-0.191(***) 
(0.02) 
Fraction age 15-24  
-0.148 
(0.26) 
0.705(***) 
(0.17) 
0.650(***) 
(0.13) 
Fraction age 55-64  
-0.296 
(0.24) 
0.443 
(0.29) 
0.239 
(0.22) 
Dummy Flanders 1990-
2005  
2.17(***) 
(0.65) 
4.55(***) 
(1.53) 
1.59 
(1.00) 
R-squared within 
R-squared between 
R-squared overall 
0.74 
0.23 
0.43 
- 
- 
0.40 
- 
- 
0.62 
J-statistic (p-value) (a) 0.00 0.98 0.00 
Time dummies no yes no 
District dummies yes no no 
Number of observations 232 232 232 
Note: * (**) (***) indicates statistical significance at 10% (5%) (1%). Between brackets 
are estimated standard errors 
(a) Sargan-Hansen J-test of overidentifying restrictions. The null hypothesis is 
that the overidentifying restrictions are correct.  
5.3 Additional results: size of the Oswald effect, robustness 
Table 6 summarizes the results of a series of additional regressions that we have run, and 
where we include not just OWNit in the employment regression, but also one or more 
interaction terms OWNit*VARi, where VARi stands for a structural variable at the district level 
which may affect the size of the Oswald effect. Included structural variables are: a dummy 
for districts situated at a national or linguistic border
14
, a dummy for districts close to one of 
the major cores of economic activity in Belgium (Brussels, Antwerp, Ghent, Liege and 
Charleroi), the log of average population density in the district, and the log of the average 
share of highly educated inhabitants
15
. Another interaction term that we include is a dummy 
common to all districts for the more recent period 1990-2005. Including this dummy (times 
OWNit) allows to test whether the Oswald coefficient has changed over time. 
                                                          
14
 This also includes districts at the border between Dutch-speaking Flanders and French-speaking Wallonia. 
15
 These averages are computed per district over all years in our sample (1970, 1977, 1981,…). 
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Table 6. Influence of structural variables on the estimated Oswald coefficient 
 
Determinants of the Oswald effect. 
Different effect... 
Change in estimated Oswald 
coefficient 
(a) 
 
Interaction 
term included 
separately 
Interaction terms 
included together 
(and p-value ≤ 30%) 
for districts at a national or linguistic border? 
District where at least 30% of the municipalities are situated 
at a national or linguistic border (versus other districts) 
 
- 0.383 (°) 
 
- 
for districts close to an economic centre / major city (b)? 
Districts close to an economic centre (versus other districts) 
+ 0.222 (°) - 
for densely populated areas? 
Effect of a rise in population density by one standard 
deviation (= +226 persons per square kilometre) (c) 
+ 0.323  - 
depending on the share of highly educated people ? 
Effect of a rise in the fraction of highly educated by one 
standard deviation (= +2.45 percentage points in ‘schooling’) (c) 
+ 0.132 (°)  + 0.160(*) 
in the past versus more recent periods? 
Change in estimated Oswald coefficient for 1990-2005 
(versus 1970-1989) 
+ 0.144 (°) - 0.047(°) 
Note:  (*) (°) statistically significant at less than 10% (20%).  
            (a) A negative change points at a stronger Oswald effect. 
            (b) Interaction term is a dummy that equals 1 in the districts of the major cores of economic activity (that is, 
Brussels, Antwerp, Ghent, Liege and Charleroi) and in the adjacent districts. 
            (c) Standard deviations are determined over the 42 district averages for population density/schooling over 
1970-2005. The log of these district averages are also the data for VARi that we use in the interaction term 
OWNit*VARi by which we extend Equation (1). 
The data in Table 6 indicate the change in the estimated effect from the rate of ownership 
on the employment rate brought about by the interaction variable. One column shows the 
results from including each interaction term separately to the regression reported in Table 4, 
column (2). The other column follows from including all interaction terms together but 
dropping those with p-values above 30%. Only two interaction terms survive here. Only one 
of these is statistically significant at 10%. Our results reveal a weaker Oswald effect in 
districts with a higher share of highly educated people, thereby confirming Dohmen (2005). 
As to other interaction terms, we see a stronger Oswald effect in districts closer to a 
linguistic or country border. All other things equal, proximity of a border may imply higher 
costs to be mobile (e.g. personal costs due to a change of language, or transaction costs due 
to a shift of legal regime). Furthermore, the Oswald effect would seem to be weaker in 
densely populated districts and in districts closer to major cores of economic activity (i.e. 
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districts close the major cities). However, none of these differences are statistically 
significant. Neither do we observe significant differences in the Oswald effect over time. 
Additional tests with different time periods than those reported in Table 6 did not yield any 
interesting results. 
Table 7 includes the main results of a number of robustness checks on our findings in column 
(2) in Table 4. In particular we tested the robustness of the estimated coefficient on 
ownership (γ1) for changes in the functional form that we impose on the relationship 
between ownership and the employment rate, and for changes in the included years. 
Table 7. Robustness checks to the regression result in column (2) in Table 4 
 
Note: (**), (***)  statistically significant at less than 5% (1%).  
(a) The Oswald effect as we report it in this paper (i.e. dEmpl/dOWN) can be derived as 
the estimated coefficient (-0.189) divided by the level of OWN. Evaluated at the 
overall sample mean (70%), this implies an Oswald effect equal to -0.27.  
(b) The Oswald effect as we report it in this paper (i.e. dEmpl/dOWN) can be derived as 
the estimated coefficient multiplied by the level of Empl. Evaluated at the overall 
sample mean (57%), this implies an Oswald effect equal to -0.38. 
 
Furthermore, in one regression we introduced the number of jobs located in a district as the 
dependent variable, rather than the employment rate among the people living there. None 
of these changes have important effects on our results. The last row of Table 7 shows the 
Robustness checks: estimated coefficients in case we... γ1 
Include log(OWN) instead of OWN as explanatory variable 
(a)
 
-0.189(***) 
 (0.04)          
Include log(Empl)  instead of Empl as dependent variable  
(b)
 
-0.667(***) 
(0.14) 
Compute the employment rate as the ratio of the number of 
jobs in a district to population at working age 
-0.345(**) 
(0.15) 
Drop the year 1977 (for which many data were missing and had 
to be computed by interpolation, see Appendix 2) 
-0.351(***) 
(0.09) 
Drop the year 2005 (for which ownership data were missing for 
Walloon districts, and some other sources had to be explored for 
other variables, see Appendix 2). 
-0.469(***) 
(0.10) 
Drop the years 1977 and 2005 
-0.461(***) 
(0.11) 
Replace the employment rate as dependent variable by the 
unemployment rate 
0.302(***) 
(0.11) 
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estimated Oswald effect when we introduce a somewhat more fundamental change. Here 
we estimate our model with the unemployment rate as dependent variable. A first reason 
for introducing this change is that Oswald’s thesis mainly concerns the unemployment rate. 
A second one is that movements in homeownership may also induce changes in labour force 
participation, implying a difference between the response of unemployment versus that of 
employment. For example, due to a positive wealth effect, homeowners may retire earlier 
than renters. Also, the need for both man and wife to work may be smaller when they are 
outright homeowners. We show detailed estimation results with the unemployment rate as 
dependent variable in Appendix C. The results are highly similar to those explaining the 
employment rate. The estimated Oswald coefficient is 0.30, and statistically very significant. 
Again we observe a strong fall in this coefficient when we disregard endogeneity and 
estimate by means of OLS. 
6. Conclusions 
In a number of papers A.J. Oswald argues that high rates of homeownership may imply 
inferior labour market outcomes, both for the individual and in the aggregate. This paper 
tests Oswald’s hypothesis in a macro panel of 42 Belgian districts since the 1970s. The use of 
data going back to 1970 allows us to embed the Oswald hypothesis in a broader model 
including important other determinants of employment like labour costs and productivity, 
the skill level of the population, and a number of demographic variables. Considering that 
ownership may be endogenous to (shocks in) employment, we mainly use IV estimation 
methods.  
Overall, we find evidence in favour of Oswald’s hypothesis. We observe that a 1 
percentage point rise in the rate of homeownership in a district implies a statistically 
significant fall in the employment rate by about 0.35 percentage points. The size of this 
effect is economically important. Additional estimation reveals that the Oswald effect is 
smaller in districts with higher fractions of high skilled. Our results underscore the 
importance of controlling for unobserved cross-sectional fixed effects and common time 
effects, and of appropriately dealing with endogeneity. Disregarding one or more of these 
issues, as is generally done in the macro labour literature, may imply very different 
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estimation results. (We then observe a weaker Oswald effect, or no Oswald effect at all). Our 
main result in favour of Oswald’s hypothesis survives various robustness checks. These 
include changes in the dependent variable. Changing our focus to unemployment rather 
than employment, does not affect our main conclusion. 
The literature on the effect of homeownership on employment shows a remarkable 
contradiction. Micro studies generally reject Oswald’s hypothesis, whereas most macro 
studies support it. One explanation for this contradiction may the methodological weakness 
of many macro studies. We avoid these weaknesses in this paper but still confirm Oswald’s 
hypothesis, at least for Belgium. This leaves a very interesting avenue for further research, 
where we shall use micro data for Belgium to estimate the influence of housing status on 
unemployment duration, like in Munch et al. (2006) and Battu et al. (2008). Is Belgium 
different, and does the adverse employment effect from homeownership in macro data also 
exist at the individual level? Factors that might make Belgium different can for example be 
very high transaction costs of buying and selling houses, relatively generous unemployment 
benefits (long benefit duration), or the specific linguistic situation restraining mobility. Or, 
alternatively, is the adverse macro relationship rather due to negative effects from (high) 
ownership beyond the owners themselves, like traffic congestion, or a tightening of rental 
markets?  
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Appendix A: Belgian provinces and districts 
 
Figure A1. Belgian provinces and districts 
 
Average size of a district: 723 km² 
Average number of inhabitants per district: 214,000 
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Appendix B: Data description and sources 
Most our data have been taken from the national censuses held in Belgium. Because we only 
had censuses in the years 1970, 1981 and 1991, we had to supplement these with data from 
extensive surveys (Social-Economic Survey, Woonsurvey). These surveys have been tested 
and confirmed to be representative by the statistical authorities (Nationaal Instituut voor de 
Statistiek, NIS). Not every variable is available in the censuses and surveys, so for some data 
we had to rely on other sources. We now consider every variable of our model and give a 
short description. We mention data sources and possible data shortages or adjustments. 
Table B1 contains the main descriptive statistics for those variables (instruments) that are 
not yet included in Table 2. 
 
OWN (Homeownership rate) 
The fraction of houses that are occupied by their owner. 
Source: Census 1970, 1981 and 1991 by NIS; Social-Economic Survey 1977 and 2001 by NIS; 
Woonsurvey 2005 by the Flemish Government. Data for 2005 are not available for the 
Walloon districts. 
 
Empl (Labour market performance, employment rate) 
Employment rate among households living in the district, i.e. the number of people with a 
job in the district in percent of the population at working age. Source: Census 1970, 1981 
and 1991 by NIS; Social-Economic Survey 2001 by NIS; ‘Steunpunt Werk en Sociale 
Economie’ for 2005. The data for 1977 have been interpolated from the years 1970 and 
1981. 
 
Unemployment (Labour market performance, unemployment rate) 
Unemployment rate among households living in the district, i.e. the number of people 
without a job but seeking employment in percent of the labour force. Source: Census 1970, 
1981 and 1991 by NIS; Social-Economic Survey 2001 by NIS; ‘Steunpunt Werk en Sociale 
Economie’ for 2005. The data for 1977 have been interpolated from the years 1970 and 
1981. 
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Schooling 
The number of highly skilled people (tertiary education) in percent of the population of age 
14 or older. Source: Census 1970, 1981 and 1991; Eurostat for 2001. 1977 has been 
interpolated from 1970 and 1981. 2005 has been extrapolated from 2001 based on the data 
of 2001 and the evolution of the national mean according to NIS Labour Force Survey. 
 
Wage 
Real compensation per employee. Source: own calculations based on Cambridge 
Econometrics data. Data for 1970 and 1977 have been extrapolated based on NIS Social 
Statistics. Due to data limitations, wages have been computed at the level of the provinces. 
Provinces include about 4 districts on average. 
 
Productivity (q) 
Real GDP per capita. Source: own calculations based on Cambridge Econometrics data. Per 
capita GDP in 1970 and 1977 have been extrapolated based on Cambridge Econometrics and 
OECD Economic Outlook data. Due to data limitations, productivity has been computed at 
the level of the provinces. Provinces include about 4 districts on average. 
 
Wage gap 
Ratio of wage level to productivity, index with Belgium in 1970 = 1. 
 
Demographic variables 
• Age xx-yy: People of age between xx and yy in percent of the total population. 
Source: Census 1970, 1981 and 1991 by NIS; Social-Economic Survey 2001 by NIS for 
2001, and 'FOD Economie, KMO, Middenstand en Energie’ for 2005 (Rijksregister). 
The data for 1977 have been interpolated from the years 1970 and 1981. 
 
Population Density 
Population density, number of people per square kilometre. 
Sources: district area: Eurostat; district population: Census 1970, 1981 and 1991, Social-
Economic Survey 2001, 1977 has been interpolated from 1970 and 1981. 2005: Ecodata, 
‘FOD Economie, KMO, Middenstand en Energie’ (Rijksregister).  
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Infrastructure 
The length of highways and county roads per square kilometre. 
Source: 1970, 1977, 1981 and 1991: NIS, Statistical yearbooks for Belgium; 2001 and 2005: 
FOD Mobiliteit en Vervoer (Processing: FOD Economie (Afdeling Statistiek)). 
 
Table B1. Main descriptive statistics for the instrumental variables 
  Infrastructure Population density Age 35+ 
Overall Mean 0.443 333 52.0% 
Minimum 0.249 34 41.1% 
First quartile 0.390 154 49.6% 
Median 0.464 268 52.2% 
Third quartile 0.502 506 54.6% 
Maximum 0.544 955 59.3% 
Std. Dev. 0.074 226 3.5% 
Between Std. Dev. 0.034 228 1.7% 
Within Std. Dev. 0.066 16 1.8% 
1970 mean 0.350 321 50.4% 
1977 mean 0.392 326 50.6% 
1981 mean 0.418 328 50.6% 
1991 mean 0.479 333 52.2% 
2001 mean 0.510 342 54.3% 
2005 mean 0.512 347 53.9% 
Observations 252 252 252 
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Appendix C: Estimation results for the unemployment rate 
Table C1: Estimation results for the unemployment rate  
 
 
UNEMPLOYMENT 2 – 2SLS    3 – 2SLS    2 - OLS   
Homeownership rate 
(OWN) 
0.302(***) 
(0.11) 
0.299(***) 
(0.11) 
0.118 (**) 
(0.05) 
Schooling 
0.004 
(0.18) 
0.005 
(0.17) 
-0.119 
(0.09) 
100*Log (wage gap) 
0.363(***) 
(0.08) 
0.362(***) 
(0.08) 
0.129(***) 
(0.03) 
 
Fraction age 15-24  
 
Fraction age 15-24  
X Dummy1970-1989 
 
Fraction age 15-24  
X Dummy1990-2005 
 
0.004 
(0.25) 
 
_ 
 
 
_ 
 
 
- 
 
 
-0.013 
(0.26) 
 
-0.010 
(0.29) 
 
-0.013 
(0.21) 
 
_ 
 
 
_ 
 
Fraction age 55-64  
 
Fraction age 55-64  
X Dummy1970-1989 
 
Fraction age 55-64  
X Dummy1990-2005 
 
0.363 
(0.24) 
 
_ 
 
 
_ 
 
- 
 
 
0.329 
(0.25) 
 
0.445 
(0.31) 
 
0.302 
(0.19) 
 
_ 
 
 
_ 
Dummy Flanders 1990-
2005  
-4.00(***) 
(1.01) 
-3.95(***) 
(1.01) 
-5.87(***) 
(0.51) 
R-squared within 
R-squared between 
R-squared overall 
0.84 
0.16 
0.44 
0.84 
0.16 
0.44 
0.89 
0.25 
0.66 
J-statistic (p-value) (a) 0.88 0.89 - 
Time dummies yes yes yes 
District dummies yes yes yes 
Number of observations 232 232 232 
 
Note: The estimation results in this table correspond to those in Table 4, but have the 
unemployment rate as dependent variable. The set of instruments used in the 2SLS 
regressions includes the aggregate regional log real wage gap, population density, 
population density squared, a time trend for the districts of the 6 major cities, and the 
fraction of the population older than 35. 
* (**) (***) indicates statistical significance at 10% (5%) (1%). Between brackets are 
estimated standard errors. 
(a) Sargan-Hansen J-test of overidentifying restrictions. The null hypothesis is that the 
overidentifying restrictions are correct.  
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Abstract 
Housing tenure is a key determinant of geographical mobility. We estimate several probit 
models to explain the probability that households move, using Belgian longitudinal PSBH and 
EU-SILC datasets which together cover the period 1994-2009. We confirm the general 
conclusion in previous literature, that homeowners are, ceteris paribus, less mobile than 
tenants. Within the first category, having a mortgage further hampers mobility. Earlier 
results for Belgium did not find a significant difference between outright owners and 
mortgagees. Furthermore, we make progress on the existing literature by paying particular 
attention to (and dealing with) methodological issues such as unobserved heterogeneity and 
state dependence. However, we also obtain some indications that the strict exogeneity 
assumption may be violated, implying that we cannot exclude the possibility of some bias in 
our estimated coefficients. 
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1. Introduction 
The most cited study in the literature regarding residential mobility, is assumably the 
work of Rossi (1955). This book is believed to have had the greatest influence on later 
empirical work since it was the first to extensively analyze geographical mobility at the micro 
level. Before, academic research mainly concentrated on aggregate mobility flows between 
regions. Rossi (1955) already concluded that housing tenure is one of the major 
determinants of mobility. Although he conducted his research from a primarily sociological 
point of view, his micro focus was rapidly adopted by economists. Many studies elaborated 
further on this early work, often focusing on diverse subfields (e.g. housing satisfaction by 
Diaz-Serrano & Stoyanova (2010); quality of the neighbourhood by Rabe and Taylor (2010a); 
public policy implications by Caldera Sánchez and Andrews (2011b); social capital by Kan 
(2007) and house prices and housing supply by Ferreira et al. (2008) and Rabe and Taylor 
(2010b)). 
In economics, a major motivation for analyzing residential mobility is assuredly the 
link between geographical mobility and the labour market. As Blanchard and Katz (1992) 
demonstrate, mobility is a key instrument to resolve mismatches in the labour market. 
Mobile workers will move from regions hit by adverse labour demand shocks to regions with 
a higher labour demand or with specific requests for specialized skills. In the early research 
by Rossi (1955) and later by Speare et al. (1975), Hughes and McCormick (1981, 1987) and 
Clark and Dieleman (1996), the consensus holds that tenants are more mobile than 
homeowners. The latter experience higher costs when buying and selling a dwelling
1
. The 
research topic gained increasing attention since the influential work of Oswald (1996, 1997), 
in which these arguments where used to explain the harmful effects of homeownership on 
labour market outcomes. In particular, Oswald concludes that countries/states with a higher 
fraction of homeownership suffer from higher unemployment rates. In this paper we 
investigate whether owners are indeed less geographically mobile in Belgium. Of course, 
finding lower mobility would not directly prove Oswald’s theory to be valid. It should be 
rather considered as a necessity and not a sufficiency for the validity of Oswald’s hypothesis. 
                                                          
1
 These might include search costs, all kinds of transfer taxes, real estate agency fees, solicitor fees and 
refinancing costs. 
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The existing empirical literature can be categorized along several axes. A first one is the type 
of dataset that is used. First, a few studies (e.g. Gardner et al. (2001), Ermisch and Di Salvo 
(1996)) were able to use data that run over a very long period, even multiple decades. This 
enables the researchers to observe individual’s complete moving history and therefore 
adopt a duration analysis. Although it is a powerful tool, important drawbacks are the high 
rate of attrition and the loss of quality when retrospective data are collected with large 
intervals. Second, many studies use cross-sectional data (e.g. Hughes & McCormick (1981, 
1987), Helderman et al. (2004), Caldera Sánchez & Andrews (2011b)). The main shortcoming 
of these studies is that they fail to account for unobserved heterogeneity. Third, longitudinal 
panel data that cover a limited time period became increasingly popular over the last few 
decades. The advantages over the cross-sectional datasets are clear. The main drawback is 
that they are only able to analyze a snapshot of the total moving history. In the empirical 
section, we explain how we attempt to resolve this matter. 
A second way to categorize is in the distinction between different types of housing 
tenure that have been introduced by researchers, and in the differential effects each type 
may have. First, tenants can be alternatively defined as private tenants or social tenants. 
Hughes and McCormick (1981, 1987) find that the higher mobility of social tenants 
compared to owners only holds over short distances. When only considering moves over a 
long distance, this group is even less mobile than owners. The reason for this is that public 
sector tenants could risk losing their benefits if they migrate. Often, the demand for social 
accommodation is higher than the supply, so people could end up on waiting lists or lose 
their chance of public housing entirely (Champion et al., 1998). Hence, the group of tenants 
cannot be considered as a homogeneous group. Second, a more recent distinction has been 
made between homeownership with a mortgage and outright homeownership. There is 
much less of a consensus about this topic. From a theoretical point of view, Böheim and 
Taylor (2002) address negative equity as a potential obstruction to mobility, in particular for 
mortgagees. If house prices drop, homeowners are restrained to move since a transaction 
will transpose their virtual loss into actual loss. Although Belgian average house prices did 
not decrease since the first half of the 1980s, the negative equity effect can still emerge for a 
different reason. According to Catte et al. (2004) and Van Ommeren and van Leuvensteijn 
(2005), the above described housing transaction costs are about 23% of the total house price 
62 
 
in Belgium, directly causing a lock-in effect for homeowners
2
. We deduce two reasons why 
mortgage holders are constrained the most in this framework. A first one is that transaction 
costs are higher due to bank costs and extra solicitor fees. As a second one, mortgage 
holders are assumed to be more prone to the negative equity trap than outright owners, due 
to the financial constraints in case debt exceeds the market value of their current residence. 
Caldera Sánchez and Andrews (2011a) raise one counterargument to this: the mortgagees’ 
greater incentive to remain employed or regain employment more rapidly. According to 
their theory, owners with a mortgage will have a larger urge for mobility to preserve the 
ability to repay their mortgage. 
Empirically, the panel data analyses of Böheim and Taylor (2002) and Rabe and Taylor 
(2010a) conclude that outright owners are significantly more mobile than owners with a 
mortgage. However, Caldera Sánchez and Andrews (2011a,b) find the opposite result in 
almost all OECD countries, using a cross-section of EU-SILC data. They confirm the lower 
mobility of mortgagees only for Israel, Luxemburg, Norway, the UK and the US. Belgium is 
one of the exceptions where no significant difference between the two groups of 
homeowners is found. 
In this paper, we investigate the impact of housing tenure on residential mobility using the 
PSBH and more recent EU-SILC datasets. We control for differences between both types of 
tenants and further investigate the disputed effect of having a mortgage for owner-
occupiers. We derive the model specification from the abovementioned literature and adopt 
the methodology that has been employed by Tatsiramos (2009), Rabe and Taylor (2010a) 
and Diaz-Serrano and Stoyanova (2010). We handle unobserved heterogeneity and 
contribute to these models by treating the initial conditions problem. To our knowledge, this 
is the first extensive study for Belgium. Only Caldera Sánchez and Andrews (2011b) report 
estimates for Belgium within an international comparison, based on cross-sectional data. For 
various reasons, Belgium is a very interesting case to study. Since it is a very densely 
populated country, the social costs of commuting are considerable. Therefore, a high degree 
of residential mobility is desirable. Also, the number of homeowners in Belgium is very high 
compared to most Western countries, representing about 70% of Belgian households 
                                                          
2
 Since 2002, Flanders altered its system of stamp duties, permitting a discount in stamp duties subject to the 
stamp duties paid for a previous purchase. This policy measure mitigates the lock-in effect to some extent. 
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according to our sample. If homeowners are indeed less mobile, this may have a very large 
impact on the Belgian labour market. Finally, the above mentioned Belgian transaction costs 
are the highest among OECD countries. Consequently, residential mobility of homeowners, 
especially with a mortgage, is expected to be very low. The paper confirms that homeowners 
are indeed less mobile than tenants. If the owner-occupier has a mortgage, mobility further 
decreases. Social tenants have a lower propensity of moving than private tenants. Although 
we tackle a number of methodological issues by employing more advanced estimators, 
caution is still required when interpreting the results because of a potentially remaining 
endogeneity bias in the estimates. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the methodological background 
of the different estimators that we use. In Section 3 we discuss the different determinants 
that are included in the model specification. Furthermore, some basic descriptive statistics 
are shown of both the explanatory variables and the dependent variable, geographical 
mobility, in order to provide the reader with some first insights. In Section 4 we present the 
estimation results. Section 5 concludes. 
2. Methodology 
Both data sources, PSBH and EU-SILC, offer the advantage of longitudinal data. First 
of all, this allows us to analyse expressed rather than revealed preferences of mobility. 
Second, panel data make it possible to take unobserved heterogeneity into account. Recent 
studies using only cross-sectional data such as Calderea Sánchez and Andrews (2011b) and 
Lux and Sunega (2012) explicitly acknowledge it as a shortcoming when a time dimension is 
lacking. In this section, we elaborate on the different econometric models that are used by 
Tatsiramos (2009), Rabe and Taylor (2010a) and Diaz-Serrano and Stoyanova (2010). We 
draw particular attention to the issues of unobserved heterogeneity. We make progress on 
these studies by also taking state-dependence and the strict exogeneity assumption into 
account. 
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2.1 The pooled Probit model 
Whether a household moves or not over the subsequent year, is a binary choice. The 
observed variable ity  is equal to 1 in case of mobility between t and t+1, and 0 otherwise. To 
indicate the panel structure of our data, the subscripts i and t are used to denote the 
household and year respectively. The probability to move is assumed to depend on a 
continuous unobserved latent variable *ity  (with 1ity = if * 0ity > and 0ity = otherwise). We 
adopt a Probit model. This specifies the probability that * 0ity > is a cumulative standard 
normal distribution. The latent propensity *ity can then be written as: 
' ' '
0
*
H it Z it R itit itH Z Ry νβ β β β+ + + += ,  (1)  
with 'itH : vector of housing tenure dummies 
 'itZ :  vector of household characteristics 
 'itR :  vector of area characteristics 
 itν :  error term 
The exact elements out of which the different vectors consist, are described in the data 
section. Equation (1) shows a model which ignores unobserved heterogeneity. This is known 
as the Pooled Probit model and is very similar to the cross-sectional Probit model. 
2.2 Dealing with unobserved time-invariant heterogeneity 
Having repeated observations for each household enables us to deal with unobserved time-
invariant heterogeneity. We decompose the error term from equation (1) into: 
i ititν µ ε= + ,  (2)  
with iµ  denoting the time-invariant term and itε  denoting the time-variant term. Several 
estimation options are possible to treat unobserved heterogeneity. If the time-invariant 
household effect iµ  is independent from the explanatory variables, the Random Effects 
Probit estimator is suitable and efficient. However, many scenarios can be thought of in 
which this assumption is violated. Some unobserved household-specific characteristics may 
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affect both mobility and the explanatory variables. For example, households that have an 
intrinsically larger urge for stability, will have a lower probability of moving and might also 
have a higher propensity of homeownership. When these suspicions are justified, the 
Random Effects estimator produces inconsistent results. In this case, many refer naturally to 
the Fixed Effects estimator as a valid alternative. However, unlike linear models, non-linear 
models do not allow to estimate the fixed effects as dummies along with the rest of the 
equation through MLE when T does not go to infinity. This problem yields inconsistent 
estimates and is commonly known as the incidental parameters problem (see e.g. 
Wooldridge, 2010). To overcome this obstacle, it is common to use the Conditional Logit 
model (Chamberlain, 1980). Diaz-Serrano and Stoyanova (2010) see three important 
drawbacks to this method. First, observations with only positive or only negative outcomes 
of mobility are excluded from the sample. This is critical because non-movers in our dataset 
are a numerous group and particularly relevant to our research question. Second, the effect 
of time-invariant explanatory variables cannot be estimated. Third, explanatory variables 
with limited variation over time are weakly estimated because much of the variation is 
absorbed by the fixed effects. This is an unattractive feature since housing tenure varies 
rather little over time. Therefore, a more appropriate model is required. 
In an attempt to preserve the convenient properties of the Random Effects model 
without conceding to the rather unrealistic assumption of the covariates being uncorrelated 
with the error term, Tatsiramos (2009), Rabe and Taylor (2010a) and Diaz-Serrano and 
Stoyanova (2010) suggest using an alternative specification. Following Mundlak (1978), the 
assumption is relaxed by allowing that iµ  is indeed correlated. The Mundlak approach 
assumes that the regression function of iµ  is linear in the within-individual mean values of 
the time-variant explanatory variables (denoted by iH′  and iR′ ). For our model, this boils 
down to: 
0i H i R i iH R eµ α α α′ ′= + + + ,  (3)  
where ie  is the individual effect with 
2(0, )i ee N σ∼  and not correlated with , ,it it itH Z R′ ′ ′  and 
itν . 0α  is absorbed by the constant term 0β  in equation (1). Intuitively, this approach can 
easily be rationalized. If some unobserved fixed household-specific characteristic affects 
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,′ ′it itH Z  or ′itR , then it will be reflected in the individual-specific mean values of these 
variables, denoted by iH′ , iZ ′  and iR′ . By including these individual-specific mean values in 
the regression, any relevant influence of the underlying unobserved fixed characteristic is 
taken out of the error term. Correlation between included explanatory variables and the 
error term is then no longer possible, at least not for this reason
3
. Note that when we adopt 
this procedure in Section 4, the vector of within-means of household characteristics iZ ′  is 
not included among the Mundlak terms. The reason is that we keep these characteristics 
constant at their initial value in the first period of observation (see Section 2.4. below). 
2.3 State-dependence and the Wooldridge approach 
Yet another issue is the possible appearance of state-dependence. In the introduction, we 
discussed the dichotomy between studies using duration models and research based on 
shorter longitudinal intervals, using discrete choice models. The latter attempts to evaluate a 
flow sample using a static model, also known as stock sampling. Many households probably 
have rarely or never moved while others have moved several times before the start of the 
survey. This information is ignored in the previously described specifications and is 
apparently not a point at issue in the aforementioned literature. Past mobility however may 
influence the probability of current mobility. One might be less tied to the neighbourhood or 
the house. Also, moving requires a large effort with respect to search and logistic costs. We 
believe that repeated moves lower these costs through learning effects. Hence, households 
that moved more recently may be more likely to move in a later period compared to an 
otherwise identical household. This situation is called state-dependence. Because the period 
of observation does not coincide with the whole mobility history of the household, the initial 
condition problem has to be considered. A bias could result from the possible correlation 
between unobserved heterogeneity and lagged values of the dependent variable. In the 
aforementioned literature this issue has not yet been tackled. 
                                                          
3
 The effect of unobserved fixed characteristics that are not correlated with the explanatory variables cannot 
be removed from the error term by this procedure. But that is not a problem. When there is no correlation 
with the included explanatory variables, the error term will not be correlated with these variables either. 
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Wooldridge (2005) suggests a computational inexpensive solution to this problem. 
The Wooldridge approach adds the initial condition 0iy  as a supplementary regressor to the 
model. Alternatively, we use the number of years that passed ( 0T ) since the last move at the 
start of the observed period, as a proxy for the initial condition. This variable controls for the 
mobility prior to the observed period. Next, we add a yearly changing counterpart ( tT ) which 
captures the duration effect throughout the observed period. The revised specification of 
the unobserved heterogeneity is denoted by
4
: 
0 0 0i H i R i T Tt t iH R T T eµ α α α α α′ ′= + + + + + ,  (4)  
2.4 The strict exogeneity assumption 
One of the requirements for using a panel model with unobserved heterogeneity is strict 
exogeneity. This issue has been generally neglected in the empirical mobility literature. 
Specifically, the error term itε  must be uncorrelated with the explanatory variables in all 
time periods. A well-known example to clarify the issue is family expansion. The household 
may move to a more suitable residence because it has fertility plans. This may clearly bias 
the estimated coefficients. To overcome this issue, we keep most of the variables constant 
at the initial value in the first period of the observation. In particular we do this for the large 
vector of household characteristics ′itZ . The vector of area characteristics itR′  only contains 
variables at the aggregate level, so for these variables strict exogeneity is assured by 
definition. We do not adopt this procedure for the housing tenure dummies ′itH . The reason 
is that, when values are fixed to the first period, it is no longer possible to structurally 
interpret the coefficients. So, for these housing variables we cannot exclude the possibility of 
some endogeneity. We will test whether or not the strict exogeneity assumption is violated 
by including the lead variable of housing tenure in the regression. A second drawback of 
fixing variables at the initial value, is unavoidably that some of the information in our dataset 
is neglected. If for example the household composition changes during the observed period, 
this will not be taken into account when analysing the effect on mobility. In this scenario, an 
omitted variable bias can occur. These two disadvantages probably explain why the previous 
                                                          
4
 Again using a Random Effects estimator. 
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literature did not adopt this approach. Nevertheless, we believe that neglecting the 
apparent absence of strict exogeneity for many of the variables, may induce even stronger 
limitations. 
After having discussed the data in Section 3, Section 4 provides the results and evaluates the 
four models that are introduced in this section. To sum up, the Pooled Probit model neglects 
unobserved heterogeneity, while the Random Effects Probit estimator requires that it is 
uncorrelated with the regressors. This assumption is weakened by the Mundlak approach. 
The Wooldridge approach tackles the potential initial condition problem. Last, we explicitly 
test whether the assumption of strict exogeneity holds. 
3. Data 
We use data from two different surveys of Belgian households. Together they cover 
the period 1994-2009 with a temporary break in 2003. For the period 1994-2002 we use the 
PSBH survey (Panel Study for Belgian Households). This survey ran from 1992 to 2002. 
However, since it was only normalized and integrated into the European Community 
Household Panel (ECHP) in 1994, the first two waves are withdrawn from our panel. The 
PSBH contains a wide range of socio-economic variables, both at the household level and at 
the level of its members
5
. It was built to serve as a longitudinal database, making it possible 
to analyse various social issues over time. From the 9 waves of the panel we can extract 8 
time periods (T=8) and a total of 18,262 household-years after omitting the observations 
with missing values. 
Second, we study the period 2004-2009 with the EU Statistics on Income and Living 
Conditions (EU-SILC), which is the more widespread successor of ECHP
6
. It comprises similar 
variables as its predecessor, although a direct comparison between both is not appropriate. 
The main difference is the set-up of the dataset. The EU-SILC dataset is also longitudinal but 
it is constructed as a rotating panel of 4 subsamples, each year replacing one fourth of the 
total sample. In this way, a household can stay in the panel for a maximum of 4 years. Each 
                                                          
5
 More information and metadata: http://www.psbh.be 
6
 More information and metadata: http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/microdata/eu_silc 
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subsample contains initially 1,500 households. Our total panel counts 6 waves (so T=5) and a 
total of 13,434 household-years. 
A first choice in constructing a feasible dataset is whether to work with households or 
individuals as sample units. To resolve this issue, we follow the arguments of Hughes and 
McCormick (1981) and van Ham et al. (2010). The event of a residential move is a household 
decision and the probability of moving depends to a large extent on household 
characteristics. Alternatively, Hughes and McCormick (1987) use the “heads of households” 
as sample unit, but this might seem somewhat arbitrary. Of course, sometimes households 
are forced to move when a split occurs as a result of a divorce or the end of co-housing. We 
consider these events as random and not in the scope of our subject. Therefore, these 
households are eliminated from the sample.  
A second refinement of our dataset is to drop households without at least one 
person of the age group 25 to 64. The lower boundary (age 0-24) largely filters out first time 
movers and students while the upper boundary (age 65-…) filters out the so-called pension 
mobility. As noticed in the introduction, we are particularly interested in mobility benefiting 
the labour market and therefore restrict our sample to the population at working age (but 
older than 24). For analyses of the mobility of other groups than the population of working 
age, we refer to a wide range of existing literature (e.g. Andrew (2004), Angelini and 
Laferrère (2010)). 
Before going through the different covariates that are included in the model, we first discuss 
the dependent variable, geographical mobility. More specifically, the dependent variable 
equals 1 if the household moved within the year after period t, conditional on the 
explanatory variables in period t. In an international perspective, residential mobility is 
rather low in Belgium. Caldera Sánchez and Andrews (2011b) constructed a comparative 
study of OECD countries. They show that in 2007, almost 12% of Belgian households had 
moved over the last 2 years. This is comparable to neighbouring countries as Luxembourg, 
the Netherlands and Germany but much lower than France and the UK. The Nordic and 
Anglo-Saxon countries experience typically higher mobility, while mobility is typically low in 
eastern and southern European countries. 
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Table 1 contributes more detailed information about the observed mobility in both 
datasets. Slightly more than 5% of all observed household-years show residential mobility. 
When making a distinction between short and long distance mobility, we see that the vast 
majority of moves are local. According to the PSBH dataset, only 0.91% of household-years 
resulted in a move from one district to another. This equals 15.6% of the total number of 
moves. EU-SILC does not contain information at the district level but it does on the larger 
scale of provinces. From the total number of observations, 0.47% concern a move between 
provinces, which corresponds to 8.8% of the total number of moves. These numbers are 
clearly lower than the statistics based on the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS) that 
Böheim and Taylor (2002) report. According to their findings, 17.0% of the total number of 
moves proceeded between regions (comparable to the Belgian provinces) and 33.1% 
between Local Authority districts (comparable to Belgian districts). In the PSBH, the 
households that moved were asked about the main reason for moving house (Table 1, n°4). 
Only 7.05% of households that responded to this question, stated that the main motivation 
for mobility was work-related.  
Table 1: Some descriptive statistics of mobility 
Source: own calculations; Panel Study on Belgian Households (1992-2002), Universiteit Antwerpen, Université de Liège and 
EU-SILC (2004-2009), FOD Economie, K.M.O., Middenstand en Energie 
To summarize, the descriptive statistics in Table 1 show that only a small fraction of 
moves is non-local and that the observed mobility is only for a small part motivated by work 
related circumstances. Four our empirical analysis, the question can be asked which 
 
Move 
(%) 
Move 
(Abs.) 
No move 
(%) 
No move 
(Abs.) 
Total 
(Abs.) 
1. Overall fraction of residential mobility 
      - PSBH 
      - EU-SILC 
2. Overall fraction of long distance mobility 
      - PSBH (between districts) 
      - EU-SILC (between provinces) 
3. Overall fraction of short distance mobility 
      - PSBH (within districts) 
      - EU-SILC (within provinces) 
4. From the households that moved, which fraction 
said the main reason for mobility was (PSBH):  
     A. Work 
     B. The housing itself 
     C. Personal reasons 
 
5.86% 
5.08% 
 
0.91% 
0.47% 
 
4.94% 
4.64% 
 
 
7.05% 
69.41% 
23.54% 
 
1,039 
683 
 
162 
60 
 
877 
623 
 
 
59 
581 
197 
 
94.14% 
94.92% 
 
99.09% 
99.53% 
 
95.06% 
95.36% 
 
 
- 
- 
- 
 
16,703 
12,751 
 
17,580 
13,371 
 
16,865 
12,811 
 
 
- 
- 
- 
 
17,742 
13,434 
 
17,742 
13,434 
 
17,742 
13,434 
 
 
- 
- 
- 
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definition of mobility to use. For instance, some studies confined the dependent variable to 
long distance mobility (e.g. Hughes and McCormick (1985) and Böheim and Taylor (2002)) or 
mobility for job reasons only (Gardner et al. (2001)). Unfortunately, our two datasets do not 
allow using a more restricted definition for mobility. First of all, the number of non-local 
moves is not only small in relative numbers but also in absolute numbers. Only 162 non-local 
moves are observed in PSBH and 60 in the EU-SILC data. In order to properly estimate an 
extensive model, the sample size should be much larger. Futhermore, incorporating the 
reason of mobility would also introduce an important deficiency. It can be deduced from 
Table 1 that only 4 out of 5 movers responded to this question. The main reason is that in 
case of attrition in t+1, mobility can be observed for the most part but the reason remains 
unknown. The attrition can possibly bias the results. Although these limitations might seem 
unfortunate, we argue that both suggested refinements of the mobility definition are not 
particularly desirable. Our main research question is more general. We want to investigate 
the impact of housing tenure on residential mobility. The reason for this mobility or the 
distance is less important. 
The selection of explanatory variables in the model is based on a numerous amount of 
earlier studies
7
. The applied regressors appear repeatedly in the literature, but sometimes in 
altered form. We discuss them concisely one by one. Table 2 for PSBH and Table 3 for EU-
SILC show the composition for categorical variables and the mean and standard deviation for 
continuous variables. A distinction is made between the group of movers, non-movers and 
the total sample in order to provide some first insights into the determinants of mobility. We 
divide the explanatory variables into 3 broad categories: housing tenure, household 
characteristics and area characteristics. 
As we clarified in the introduction, in this paper tenure choice is subdivided into 4 
subcategories. We make the distinction between outright owners, owners with a mortgage, 
tenants paying rent at market rate and tenants paying rent at a reduced rate. In the total 
population the group of tenants paying rent at market rate is a little over 20%. When only 
                                                          
7
 E.g. Bartel (1979), Hughes and McCormick (1981, 1987), Gardner et al. (2001), Böheim and Taylor (2002), 
Helderman et al. (2004), Taylor (2007), Tatsiramos (2008), Diaz-Serrano and Stoyanova (2010), Rabe and Taylor 
(2010a) and Caldera Sánchez and Andrews (2011b),  
72 
 
taking the movers into account, the private tenants count for two thirds of the households-
years. 
Table 2: PSBH Descriptive Statistics of Explanatory Variables 
 
No move Move Overall 
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. 
Tenure choice 
Owner with mortgage 
Outright owner 
Private tenant 
Reduced rent 
 
0.4752 
0.2746 
0.1876 
0.0626 
  
0.1627 
0.0674 
0.6833 
0.0866 
  
0.4569 
0.2624 
0.2167 
0.0640 
 
Household characteristics 
Age 
Family structure 
Single person 
Single parent 
Childless couple 
Couple with children 
Education 
Tertiary 
Secondary 
Less than secondary 
Other 
Foreign nationality 
Monthly income 
Rooms per household member 
Years since installation 
 
43.25 
 
0.1881 
0.0589 
0.4200 
0.3330 
 
0.4399 
0.3129 
0.2471 
 
0.1203 
2,109 
1.90 
10.97 
 
10.91 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1,090 
1.28 
7.23 
 
36.96 
 
0.2878 
0.1261 
0.3012 
0.2849 
 
0.4398 
0.3147 
0.2454 
 
0.1578 
1,866 
1.83 
5.88 
 
10.15 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
997 
1.13 
5.03 
 
42.88 
 
0.1939 
0.0625 
0.4134 
0.3302 
 
0.4399 
0.3130 
0.2470 
 
0.1225 
2,094 
1.89 
10.67 
 
10.97 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1,086 
1.28 
7.22 
Area characteristics 
Prov. unemployment rate 
Housing trans./cap (t-1) 
GVA Construction/cap (t-1) 
Population density 
 
8.90 
0.0070 
0.997 
971 
 
4.33 
0.0017 
0.201 
1738 
 
9.76 
0.0069 
0.985 
1354 
 
4.41 
0.0019 
0.188 
2135 
 
8.95 
0.0070 
0.996 
994 
 
4.34 
0.0017 
0.200 
1766 
Regional dummies 
Brussels 
Flanders 
Wallonia 
 
0.1094 
0.4982 
0.3924 
 
 
 
 
 
0.1790 
0.4042 
0.4167 
 
 
 
 
 
0.1135 
0.4927 
0.3938 
 
 
 
 
Source: Own calculations; Panel Study on Belgian Households (1992-2002), Universiteit Antwerpen, Université de Liège and 
EU-SILC (2004-2009), FOD Economie, K.M.O., Middenstand en Energie  
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Table 3: EU-SILC Descriptive Statistics of Explanatory Variables 
 
No move Move Overall 
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. 
Tenure choice 
Mortgagee 
Outright owner 
Private tenant 
Reduced rent 
 
0.4191 
0.3059 
0.2033 
0.0717 
  
0.1483 
0.1057 
0.6622 
0.0837 
  
0.4053 
0.2957 
0.2266 
0.0723 
 
Household characteristics 
Age 
Family structure 
Single person 
Single parent 
Childless couple 
Couple with children 
Education 
Tertiary 
Secondary 
Less than secondary 
Other 
Foreign nationality 
Monthly income 
Rooms per household member 
Years since installation 
 
46.73 
 
0.1959 
0.1045 
0.4428 
0.2568 
 
0.4579 
0.3671 
0.1750 
 
0.1615 
34,304 
2.33 
14.47 
 
10.86 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
65,830 
1.36 
11.31 
 
39.70 
 
0.3098 
0.1292 
0.3422 
0.2188 
 
0.4640 
0.3363 
0.1997 
 
0.2775 
28,271 
2.14 
6.75 
 
10.96 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
27,681 
1.32 
7.31 
 
46.37 
 
0.2017 
0.1057 
0.4377 
0.2549 
 
0.4582 
0.3656 
0.1762 
 
0.1674 
33,998 
2.32 
14.08 
 
10.97 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
64,452 
1.36 
11.27 
Area characteristics 
Prov. unemployment rate 
Housing trans./cap (t-1) 
GVA Construction/cap (t-1) 
Population density 
 
12.25 
0.0065 
1.128 
1133 
 
6.29 
0.0017 
0.277 
1945 
 
13.18 
0.0061 
1.115 
1733 
 
6.57 
0.0019 
0.259 
2457 
 
12.30 
0.0065 
1.128 
1164 
 
6.31 
0.0017 
0.276 
1978 
Regional dummies 
Brussels 
Flanders 
Wallonia 
 
0.1274 
0.5470 
0.3256 
 
 
 
 
 
0.2305 
0.4860 
0.2834 
 
 
 
 
 
0.1327 
0.5439 
0.3234 
 
 
 
 
Source: Own calculations; Panel Study on Belgian Households (1992-2002), Universiteit Antwerpen, Université de Liège and 
EU-SILC (2004-2009), FOD Economie, K.M.O., Middenstand en Energie 
Second, we incorporate a wide range of variables that capture household 
characteristics. In order to meet the strict exogeneity assumption, these variables are fixed 
at the value of the household’s first observation in the sample as has been more elaborately 
discussed in the previous section. We introduce age and its square form to take life cycle 
effects into account. We also include its square because the relationship is not expected to 
be linear. We expect a decrease of mobility with age because of declining present 
discounted wage benefits of mobility while the cost of moving house does not decline 
(Schwartz, 1973 and Sjaastad, 1962). Because we need one observation per household, we 
use the age of the oldest member who is not yet 65. Next, a categorical variable is 
introduced that relates to family structure. The expected effect from having children is 
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ambiguous. We would expect that it becomes more costly and complex to move with a 
larger household. On the other hand, households might need to move to a larger home to 
satisfy the household’s needs. To take this last consideration into account, we follow the 
example of Helderman et al. (2004) and Böheim and Taylor (2002) and introduce a proxy for 
the so-called room-stress. We include the ratio of the number of rooms to the number of 
household members. If a household enjoys more space, it is expected to be less likely to 
move. By incorporating this variable, the expected estimate of having children on mobility is 
unambiguously negative. Cohabiting is expected to have a negative effect on mobility. 
Following the arguments of Helderman et al. (2004), we combine the properties of 
cohabiting and whether the household contains children. It is conceivable that having 
children will have a different impact on singles than on couples. Next, the level of education 
is included. To incorporate this we take into account the highest acquired degree of one of 
the household members. We make a distinction between tertiary education, higher 
secondary education and not having fulfilled secondary education. Last, we control for 
income and nationality. As to the latter, a dummy equals 1 if at least one household member 
has a foreign nationality. In the literature, the estimates for income are rather inconclusive, 
while being foreign is generally found to have a positive effect on mobility. 
Finally, the third category contains area characteristics, based on aggregate data 
derived from Cambridge Econometrics data and data from the ‘FOD Economie’, Belgian 
Federal Government. We include the provincial unemployment rate in year t as an additional 
determinant. The expectation is that households have a higher propensity to move when the 
labour market is depressed. Next, we add a number of proxies to account for housing market 
conditions: the provincial per capita number of housing market transactions in the year t-1, 
provincial per capita real gross value added (GVA) of the construction sector in t-1 and last, 
the population density in the province. These proxies should capture housing supply as a 
determinant for mobility. In a more liquid housing market, mobility is expected to be more 
accessible. Last, to control for spatial disparities, we add dummies for the different regions. 
These capture a range of legislative, cultural and demographic circumstances that could 
influence the mobility of a household. 
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4. Results 
Table 4 and Table 5 show the results for PSBH and EU-SILC respectively. In contrast to 
linear models, the estimated coefficients cannot be interpreted in a straightforward way. 
The size of the partial effects is subject to the selected values of the other regressors. 
Besides, when we use the panel dimension of the data, the partial effect also depends on 
the value of the unobserved heterogeneity, iµ . We follow the suggestion in Wooldridge 
(2005) and calculate Average Partial Effects (APE’s)
8
. This results in one single interpretable 
estimate for each determinant. For discrete variables, the partial effect equals the difference 
in probability when the dummy changes from 0 to 1. Accordingly, in case of categorical 
variables, the APE reveals the difference in moving probability compared to the reference 
category. 
The columns in each table represent the alternative estimation methods as discussed 
in the previous section: (1) is the Pooled estimator; (2) is the Random Effects estimator; (3) is 
the so-called Mundlak-approach in which the means of the time-varying regressors are 
included and (4) is the estimation in which the time since last mobility is added as a 
supplementary control variable. From a first glance, we can see that the results are quite 
similar, irrespective of the method. However, the size of the APE’s of interest changes rather 
considerably between the columns. We now discuss the suitability of the different models. 
At the bottom of the table, Rho indicates the variation that is captured by the unobserved 
household specific term. Using the RE estimator, this fraction is very low in the PSBH 
dataset, representing only 0.48% of variation. It is not significantly different from zero. Diaz-
Serrano and Stoyanova (2010) obtain a similar result. For PSBH, we can confirm their 
conclusion that household specific effects are irrelevant and hence the pooled probit model 
is a more suitable framework compared to the Random Effects estimator. Table 5 shows that 
Rho equals 11.51% in the EU-SILC case and is significantly different from zero at the 5% level. 
To compare, Böheim and Taylor (2002) obtained 10% and Rabe and Taylor (2010a) 22%. In 
contrast to Table 4, unobserved heterogeneity should be accounted for. 
  
                                                          
8
 The calculation of APE’s is very staightforward in the version of Stata®12.1 using the -margins- command. 
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Table 4: Probit coefficients and selected average partial effects based on PSBH data 
 (1) Pooled (2) RE (3) Mundlak (4) Wooldridge 
Selected average partial effects 
Tenure choice 
Owner with mortgage 
 
Private tenant 
 
Reduced rent 
 
 
-0.005 
(0.003) 
0.131(***) 
(0.007) 
0.048(***) 
(0.008) 
 
-0.005 
(0.003) 
0.131(***) 
(0.007) 
0.048(***) 
(0.009) 
 
-0.053(***) 
(0.013) 
0.133(***) 
(0.014) 
0.069(***) 
(0.019) 
 
-0.063(***) 
(0.013) 
0.118(***) 
(0.014) 
0.054(***) 
(0.018) 
Area characteristics  
Prov. unemployment rate 
 
Housing trans./cap (t-1) 
 
GVA Construction/cap (t-1) 
 
Population density  
 
Brussels 
 
Wallonia 
 
 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
1.435 
(2.235) 
0.021 
(0.015) 
0.00007(***) 
(0.00002) 
-0.135(***) 
(0.009) 
0.032(***) 
(0.008) 
 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
1.434 
(2.235) 
0.021 
(0.015) 
0.00007(***) 
(0.00002) 
-0.135(***) 
(0.009) 
0.032(***) 
(0.008) 
 
-0.002 
(0.003) 
2.668 
(7.131) 
-0.001 
(0.048) 
0.00009(***) 
(0.00002) 
-0.382(***) 
(0.118) 
0.037(***) 
(0.011) 
 
-0.004 
(0.003) 
5.038 
(7.128) 
0.019 
(0.049) 
0.00009(***) 
(0.00002) 
-0.336(***) 
(0.119) 
0.035(***) 
(0.011) 
Probit coefficients 
Age 
 
Age squared 
 
FAM: Single person 
 
FAM: Single parent 
 
FAM: Couple with children 
 
EDU: Less than secondary 
 
EDU: Tertiary 
 
Foreign nationality  
 
Ln(Income) 
 
Rooms per household member 
 
Years since installation (constant) 
 
Years since installation (continuous) 
 
Constant  
 
-0.050(***) 
(0.014) 
0.0004(**) 
(0.0002) 
0.124(**) 
(0.059) 
0.201(***) 
(0.064) 
0.027 
(0.047) 
-0.002 
(0.046) 
-0.056 
(0.041) 
0.052 
(0.049) 
0.057 
(0.044) 
-0.022 
(0.016) 
n/a 
 
n/a 
 
-1.625(***) 
(0.476) 
-0.050(***) 
(0.013) 
0.0004(**) 
(0.0002) 
0.124(**) 
(0.059) 
0.202(***) 
(0.065) 
0.027 
(0.047) 
-0.002 
(0.047) 
-0.056 
(0.041) 
0.052 
(0.049) 
0.057 
(0.044) 
-0.021 
(0.017) 
n/a 
 
n/a 
 
-1.631(***) 
(0.479) 
-0.055(***) 
(0.014) 
0.0005(***) 
(0.0002) 
0.194(***) 
(0.060) 
0.246(***) 
(0.065) 
0.051 
(0.048) 
0.098 
(0.106) 
-0.077 
(0.129) 
0.064 
(0.050) 
0.011 
(0.045) 
-0.027 
(0.017) 
n/a 
 
n/a 
 
-1.360(***) 
(0.486) 
-0.036(**) 
(0.015) 
0.0003(*) 
(0.0002) 
0.164(***) 
(0.062) 
0.198(***) 
(0.067) 
0.032 
(0.050) 
0.092 
(0.109) 
-0.101 
(0.133) 
0.054 
(0.051) 
0.0001 
(0.047) 
-0.030(*) 
(0.018) 
0.026(**) 
(0.013) 
-0.049(***) 
(0.012) 
-1.559(***) 
(0.503) 
Time dummies 
Means of time-varying covariates 
Rho 
Log likelihood 
Number of observations 
yes 
no 
n/a 
-3,402.82 
18,262 
yes 
no 
0.0048 
-3,402.80 
18,262 
yes 
yes 
0.000002 
-3,330.33 
18,262 
yes 
yes 
0.000001 
-3,149.63 
17,728 
Source: own calculations; Panel Study on Belgian Households (1992-2002), Universiteit Antwerpen, Université de Liège. 
Note: * (**) (***) indicates statistical significance at 10% (5%) (1%). Between brackets are estimated standard errors. 
The reference category represents: outright owner, employee, age 35-54, childless couple, higher secondary education, no 
foreign nationality, in the Region Flanders.  
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Table 5: Probit coefficients and selected average partial effects based on EU-SILC data 
 (1) Pooled (2) RE (3) Mundlak (4) Wooldridge 
Selected average partial effects 
Tenure choice 
Owner with mortgage 
 
Private tenant 
 
Reduced rent 
 
 
-0.010(***) 
(0.004) 
0.096(***) 
(0.008) 
0.031(***) 
(0.009) 
 
-0.009(***) 
(0.003) 
0.090(***) 
(0.008) 
0.028(***) 
(0.008) 
 
-0.044**) 
(0.019) 
0.181(***) 
(0.025) 
0.162(***) 
(0.028) 
 
-0.052(***) 
(0.019) 
0.181(***) 
(0.024) 
0.161(***) 
(0.027) 
Area characteristics  
Prov. unemployment rate 
 
Housing trans./cap (t-1) 
 
GVA Construction/cap (t-1) 
 
Population density  
 
Brussels 
 
Wallonia 
 
 
-0.0006 
(0.0006) 
-0.427 
(1.786) 
-0.006 
(0.010) 
0.000001 
(0.000002) 
-0.003 
(0.005) 
-0.001 
(0.004) 
 
-0.0006 
(0.0006) 
-0.300 
(1.673) 
-0.006 
(0.009) 
0.000001 
(0.000001) 
-0.003 
(0.005) 
-0.001 
(0.004) 
 
0.0003 
(0.0040) 
6.280 
(4.864) 
-0.016 
(0.111) 
0.00005(***) 
(0.00001) 
-0.003 
(0.005) 
-0.001 
(0.004) 
 
-0.0029 
(0.0044) 
7.383 
(5.173) 
0.101 
(0.128) 
0.00005(***) 
(0.00001) 
-0.003 
(0.006) 
-0.002 
(0.004) 
Probit coefficients 
Age 
 
Age squared 
 
FAM: Single person 
 
FAM: Single parent 
 
FAM: Couple with children 
 
EDU: Less than secondary 
 
EDU: Tertiary 
 
Foreign nationality  
 
Ln(Income) 
 
Rooms per household member 
 
Years since installation (constant) 
 
Years since installation (continuous) 
 
Constant  
 
-0.045(***) 
(0.015) 
0.0003(*) 
(0.0002) 
0.057 
(0.060) 
-0.060 
(0.073) 
0.013 
(0.053) 
0.077 
(0.058) 
0.113(**) 
(0.047) 
0.143(***) 
(0.052) 
-0.020 
(0.038) 
-0.016 
(0.018) 
n/a 
 
n/a 
 
-0.057 
(0.514) 
-0.049(***) 
(0.017) 
0.0003(*) 
(0.0002) 
0.056 
(0.065) 
-0.069 
(0.079) 
0.012 
(0.058) 
0.081 
(0.063) 
0.121(**) 
(0.051) 
0.148(***) 
(0.056) 
-0.020 
(0.041) 
-0.016 
(0.019) 
n/a 
 
n/a 
 
-0.054 
(0.556) 
-0.048(***) 
(0.016) 
0.0003(*) 
(0.0002) 
0.068 
(0.063) 
-0.047 
(0.077) 
0.009 
(0.056) 
-0.016 
(0.142) 
0.108 
(0.161) 
0.156(***) 
(0.055) 
-0.036 
(0.040) 
-0.021 
(0.019) 
n/a 
 
n/a 
 
0.135 
(0.544) 
-0.044(***) 
(0.016) 
0.0003(*) 
(0.0002) 
0.053 
(0.061) 
-0.061 
(0.073) 
0.001 
(0.054) 
-0.017 
(0.140) 
0.107 
(0.159) 
0.124(**) 
(0.053) 
-0.027 
(0.039) 
-0.020 
(0.018) 
0.083(**) 
(0.042) 
-0.099(**) 
(0.042) 
0.205 
(0.523) 
Time dummies 
Means of time-varying covariates 
Rho 
Log likelihood 
Number of observations 
yes 
no 
n/a 
-2,275.65 
13,434 
yes 
no 
0.1151(**) 
-2,273.42 
13,434 
yes 
yes 
0.0693(**) 
-2,237.48 
13,434 
yes 
yes 
0.00001 
-2,221.00 
13,431 
Source: own calculations; EU-SILC (2004-2009), FOD Economie, K.M.O., Middenstand en Energie. 
Note: * (**) (***) indicates statistical significance at 10% (5%) (1%). Between brackets are estimated standard errors. 
The reference category represents: outright owner, employee, age 35-54, childless couple, higher secondary education, no 
foreign nationality, in the Region Flanders. 
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Both tables show that the main dissimilarities appear when the so-called Mundlak 
terms are added to the Random Effects Probit model. As argued in the previous section, the 
results shown in column 2 are inconsistent if the unobserved heterogeneity term is 
correlated with the dependent variables. Because the extension of the Mundlak approach 
alters the estimates considerably and the Mundlak terms are jointly significant (not shown in 
the table), we can confirm our suspicions about the occurrence of unobserved heterogeneity 
as described in Section 2. The fourth column shows that conditioning the model on the 
duration spent in the residence, alters the magnitude of the estimated APE’s rather strongly. 
The highly significant coefficient of “years since installation (constant)” proves that 
controlling for time spent in the residence, helps explaining the model. Its continuous 
counterpart reveals a significant negative coefficient. The longer a household remains in the 
same house, the more restrained it is for future mobility. This corresponds with the 
expectations as discussed in Section 2. We consider this last specification to be the most 
suitable model. 
The results are very much in line with the expectations and similar in both datasets. 
The upper half of the tables shows the APE’s of the key explanatory variables. Consistent 
with the earlier research that we described in the introduction, the results show that private 
tenants are the most likely to move, followed by tenants paying reduced rent. Unlike the 
results of Caldera Sánchez and Andrews (2011b) for Belgium, we do find a significant 
difference between outright owners and mortgagees. Outright homeowners appear to have 
a higher propensity to move (of 6.3% for PSBH, 5.2% for EU-SILC) which is in line with the 
estimates of Böheim and Taylor (2002) and Rabe and Taylor (2010a). The area characteristics 
have only limited explanatory power. The results do not provide evidence that households 
are more mobile if the aggregate unemployment rate is high, but neither did the 
aforementioned literature. From the proxies that we introduced to capture housing market 
conditions, only population density renders a significant coefficient. Households living in 
more densely populated areas experience higher mobility. A possible reason is the higher 
liquidity of the housing market. Finally, the regional dummies have significant estimates, but 
only in the PSBH dataset. The reason for the divergent outcome of both datasets is 
impossible to deduce. One would rather expect the opposite because Belgian housing policy 
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was mainly decentralized in 2002. Of course, these regional dummies capture much more 
than this, so it is uncertain to what extent these APE’s demonstrate policy effects. 
The lower halves of Table 4 and 5 show the probit coefficients of the control 
variables. As clarified before, the estimates of these variables cannot be interpreted 
structurally because the values are fixed to the first observation of each household. 
Therefore, showing the APE’s is otiose. For both datasets, the age categories have high 
explanatory power. Next we observe that the degree of statistical significance of the 
household characteristics differs substantially between both datasets. Whereas for the PSBH 
data family structure and room stress help to determine mobility, nationality is the most 
effective control in case of the EU-SILC data. Income seems to have no influence in both 
cases, which is consistent with Kan (2007) and Diaz-Serrano and Stoyanova (2010). 
As announced in Section 2, we explicitly test whether or not the strict exogeneity 
assumption holds for the housing tenure dummies. When added to the Wooldridge 
regressions, we observe that the leads of some of these dummies do show significant 
coefficients. This result suggests that we fail to meet the assumption and caution is required 
when interpreting the estimated APE’s. These are possibly driven by the correlation between 
‘shocks’ to mobility and contemporaneous or future values of the housing tenure choice.  
5. Conclusions 
In this paper, we analyse the determinants of residential mobility in a large panel of 
Belgian households in 1994-2009. Like most papers in this literature, we find that - ceteris 
paribus - tenants are more mobile than owners. Neither of the two groups are 
homogeneous, however. Homeowners with a mortgage are less mobile than outright 
owners. Among tenants, those paying a reduced rate are significantly less mobile than 
tenants on the private market. The magnitude of the estimated average partial effects 
reveals that housing tenure is an economically significant determinant of mobility. 
Comparing the most and the least mobile groups (private tenants and mortgagees), we 
observe a difference of 18 to 23%-points in the probability per year to move. The hampered 
mobility of homeowners (especially with a mortgage) may have a large unfavourable effect 
in a country with a severely high homeownership rate. 
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Our estimation methods build on the Mundlak approach as applied in the previous 
literature (e.g. Tatsiramos (2009), Rabe and Taylor (2010a) and Diaz-Serrano and Stoyanova 
(2010)). Using the Wooldridge approach, we extend this estimation method to control for 
state-dependence. Both model specifications require strict exogeneity of the explanatory 
variables. Although the previous studies do not acknowledge this condition to obtain 
unbiased results, we have tried to avoid endogeneity by fixing as many potentially 
endogenous variables as possible at their initial value in the first period of the observation. 
Since this procedure implies, however, that a structural interpretation of the estimated 
coefficients is no longer possible, we could not impose it on the housing tenure variables. 
Tests reveal that in the end the strict exogeneity assumption may still be violated, implying 
that we cannot exclude the possibility of some bias in our estimated coefficients. The 
resulting bias probably manifests itself in all previous papers that analyse the effect of 
housing on mobility. A solution to this problem is not straightforward but progress may 
recently have been made by Biewen (2009). He developed a dynamic model (analysing 
poverty status) that explicitly allows for feedback from the dependent variable to future 
values of the explanatory variables. This might be a promising starting point for further 
research in order to avoid the remaining bias.  
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Abstract 
This paper examines the impact of housing tenure choice on unemployment duration in 
Belgium using EU-SILC micro data. We contribute to the literature in distinguishing 
homeowners with mortgage payments and outright homeowners. We simultaneously 
estimate unemployment duration by a mixed proportional hazard model, and the probability 
of being an outright homeowner, a homeowner with mortgage payments or a tenant by a 
mixed multinomial logit model. To be able to correctly identify the causal influence of 
different types of housing tenure on unemployment duration, we use instrumental variables. 
Our results show that homeowners with a mortgage exit unemployment first. Outright 
owners stay unemployed the longest. Tenants take an intermediate position. Moreover, our 
results reveal the different share of mortgage holders within the group of homeowners as a 
possible explanation for the discrepancy between former contributions to this literature.  
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1. Introduction 
Does homeownership impair an individual’s labour market outcome? Seminal work by A.J. 
Oswald (1996, 1997) suggests that it does. A key element in his view is that high costs of 
buying and selling homes make homeowners less geographically mobile than tenants. As a 
result, in case of job loss, the number of suitable vacancies within homeowners’ reach will 
be much smaller. Their exit rate from unemployment will therefore be lower. Empirically, 
many studies confirm Oswald’s claim that homeowners are geographically less mobile than 
tenants (see, e.g., Hughes and McCormick, 1981, 1987; Böheim and Taylor, 2002; Caldera 
Sánchez and Andrews, 2011; Isebaert, 2013). Nevertheless, direct research into the 
relationship between housing tenure choice and labour market outcomes using micro data 
does generally not find that homeowners have worse labour market perspectives than 
tenants. Battu et al. (2008) for example find no significant difference in the speed of 
transition from unemployment into employment among homeowners versus private tenants 
in the UK. Munch et al. (2006) even observe a faster exit from unemployment into 
employment among owners than among tenants in a large panel of Danish individuals, while 
van Leuvensteijn and Koning (2004) find a significant negative impact of homeownership on 
the risk of becoming unemployed in the Netherlands. These three papers are important not 
only for their results, but also methodologically. Each of them adequately deals with the 
impact of individuals’ unobserved characteristics which may affect both their labour market 
situation and their tenure choice. 
From a theoretical point of view, various explanations have been advanced in these 
and other micro studies to rationalize the better perspectives of owners on the labour 
market. Coulson and Fisher (2002) emphasize the importance of social networks in the 
search for work. Homeowners tend to invest more in their social network which improves 
their local job opportunities. Munch et al. (2006) add that because of high moving costs, 
homeowners have a lower reservation wage and a higher search intensity for local jobs. 
According to van Leuvensteijn and Koning (2004) and Munch et al. (2008) homeowners are 
willing to invest more in their job, in order to maximize the probability of staying in the local 
job. Accordingly, firms anticipate longer employment duration of homeowners and so are 
willing to invest in firm-specific training. This further increases firm-specific productivity of 
the homeowner. 
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This paper investigates the impact of housing tenure choice on unemployment duration in 
Belgium, using EU-SILC micro data. Our basic research question is therefore the same as that 
of Munch et al. (2006) and Battu et al. (2008). We also follow these studies in their choice of 
methodology. Our main contribution to the literature is that we distinguish different types of 
homeowners. Whereas Munch et al. (2006) only make the broad subdivision between 
homeowners and non-homeowners, and Battu et al. (2008) split up the second group into 
public and private tenants, we distinguish homeowners with mortgage payments and 
outright owners. For Belgium, where the rate of homeownership is close to 70%, this is 
clearly the most relevant distinction. About two thirds of all homeowners are mortgagees, 
about one third are outright owners
1
. From the point of view of the Oswald hypothesis, 
different labour market outcomes between both groups of owners should not be expected. 
The search and transaction costs that are associated with moving are similar for outright 
owners and mortgagees
2
. The motivation for not treating homeowners as a homogeneous 
group lies elsewhere. Rouwendal and Nijkamp (2010) embed the distinction between both 
types of owner-occupiers in a theoretical framework explaining search behaviour. Building 
on Munch et al. (2006), they develop a model with both local and non-local labour markets. 
Moving costs both decrease owners’ nonlocal job search (the Oswald effect) and increase 
their local search. The net effect of moving costs in Rouwendal and Nijkamp is that owners 
on average experience longer unemployment duration. They further advance this theoretical 
model by introducing housing costs. The fraction of the wage that is not spent on housing 
goes to nondurable consumption which determines utility. Decreasing marginal utility 
explains why the unemployed will have a higher search intensity when housing costs are 
high. This result may critically affect the earlier theoretical outcome. According to 
Rouwendal and Nijkamp’s model, if housing costs are lower for homeowners than for 
tenants (as is the case for outright homeowners), owners will experience even longer 
                                                          
1
 Private rental and social housing account for about 23% and 7% of housing supply respectively. In the UK that 
is 15.6% and 18% (Pittini and Laino, 2011).  
2
 Unsurprisingly, the above mentioned empirical literature studying geographical mobility leaves us with mostly 
ambiguous answers to the question whether outright owners or mortgagees are more geographically mobile. 
For example, in a cross-section of 23 OECD countries, Caldera Sánchez and Andrews (2011) find outright 
owners to be less residentially mobile than owners with mortgage payments in 15 countries. They observe the 
opposite in 4 other countries. In 4 last countries, one of which is Belgium, there is no significant difference 
between outright owners and mortgagees. Isebaert (2013) by contrast uses panel data and finds mortgagees to 
be less geographically mobile than outright owners in Belgium. The only robust empirical result across studies 
seems to be that tenants are more residentially mobile than owners. 
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unemployment duration. The Oswald effect is then reinforced by a (low) housing cost effect. 
If housing costs for owners are higher than for tenants (as may be the case for mortgagees), 
the reverse occurs. The unemployed owners’ search intensity will then rise, and their 
unemployment duration falls. The Oswald effect may then be beaten by a (high) housing 
cost effect. Building on this theory, one may therefore expect the fastest exit from 
unemployment for mortgagees, and the slowest for outright owners. Tenants may take an 
intermediate position
3
. 
Empirically, to the best of our knowledge, only Goss and Phillips (1997) and Flatau et al. 
(2003) made the distinction between outright owners and owners with a mortgage to 
address differences in unemployment duration before. Both papers find higher exit rates 
from unemployment for homeowners with a mortgage. Methodologically, however, the 
empirical models used in these studies do not adequately handle the potential endogeneity 
bias that may arise if a person’s unobserved characteristics affect both his unemployment 
duration and housing tenure. Munch et al. (2006) provide the example of a person who is 
inherently less mobile because of preference for stability. On the one hand, this person will 
be inclined to buy a house and settle in a chosen area. On the other hand, the stability-
preferring individual is less willing to move for job reasons, extending the duration of an 
unemployment spell. One might falsely interpret the combination of these events as a causal 
relationship from homeownership to longer unemployment. To resolve this issue, we adopt 
an econometric framework that builds on those used by van Leuvensteijn and Koning (2004), 
Munch et al. (2006) and Battu et al. (2008). More precisely, we simultaneously estimate 
unemployment duration by a mixed proportional hazard model, and the probability of being 
an outright homeowner, a homeowner with mortgage payments or a tenant by a mixed 
multinomial logit model. To be able to correctly identify the causal influence of different 
types of housing tenure on unemployment duration, we use instrumental variables 
(exclusion restrictions). These are variables that influence housing tenure but do not directly 
                                                          
3
 Available data for Belgium support the idea that housing costs differ significantly by tenure situation. 
Vastmans and Buyst (2011) reveal that monthly mortgage payments account for 24.6% of a household’s net 
monthly income, on average. Housing costs of outright owners by contrast are limited to the maintenance 
costs. As to the distinction between homeowners with a mortgage and tenants, Heylen et al. (2007) report a 
mean rental price in the Flemish region in 2005 of 396€, while the mean mortgage payment was equal to 564€. 
The latter clearly represents the heaviest burden on the household budget. Furthermore, tenants experience 
lower costs of maintenance since the depreciation of a dwelling is to a great extent at the expense of the 
owner. 
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affect unemployment duration. Finding good instruments is often a delicate task in this 
literature. We contribute by adding a new instrument, which is the relative price of buying to 
renting a house at the moment in the past that people signed the contract underlying their 
current tenure.  
This paper is the first to analyse the research question at stake for Belgium. For several 
reasons Belgium may be a very interesting case to test the link between housing and labour 
market situation at the micro level. The rate of homeownership is considerably higher than 
in the countries analysed in the aforementioned studies (van Ewijk and van Leuvensteijn, 
2009). Furthermore, Belgian tax rates on housing transactions are among the highest in the 
world (European Mortgage Federation, 2010). Also Belgian labour market characteristics 
differ strongly from those in the previously investigated countries. To mention one, 
unemployment benefit duration is much longer (OECD, 2013). Taking into account all these 
considerations, if there were one country to expect a strong Oswald effect, it would be 
Belgium. Recent macroeconomic work also confirms this. Using aggregate data of Belgian 
districts since 1970, Isebaert et al. (2013) find strong empirical evidence in favour of the 
Oswald hypothesis. 
In accordance with the aforementioned theoretical expectations in the spirit of 
Rouwendal and Nijkamp (2010), our empirical results prove that homeowners are not a 
homogeneous group. The result found by Munch et al. (2006) that homeowners have 
shorter unemployment spells than tenants, only applies to homeowners with a mortgage. 
Outright owners by contrast remain unemployed the longest. Not having to pay rent or to 
repay a mortgage seemingly decreases the search intensity of an individual. This result 
survives various robustness checks. For example, it does not depend on the specific 
exclusion restrictions that we impose on the model. Neither is it conditional on the age of 
the individuals in our sample: it also holds if we restrict the sample to owners younger than 
50.  
Our results may transcend the single Belgian case. A possible explanation for the 
discrepancy between the results of Munch et al. (2006) for Denmark and Battu et al. (2008) 
for the UK is the different share of mortgage holders within the group of homeowners. In 
Denmark the fraction of mortgagees is about 73%. Therefore, it is not surprising that the 
positive effect for this subgroup dominates the negative effect for outright owners, when no 
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distinction is made between both groups. In the UK the fraction of mortgagees in the group 
of owners is (only) about 56%. Positive and negative effects on the exit rate from 
unemployment from both subgroups may then cancel out.  
The structure of this paper is as follows. In the next section we provide the reader with an 
introduction to the dataset and some descriptive analyses. The specification of our 
methodological framework is included in Section 3. In Section 4 we show the results of our 
estimations. A final section concludes. 
2. Data and descriptive statistics 
To analyse unemployment spells in Belgium, we use the recent dataset of the European 
Union Statistics on Income and Living Conditions (EU-SILC). This survey provides longitudinal 
data of topics such as labour market conditions, education, housing tenure, income and 
social exclusion. It was designed in order to replace the less harmonized European 
Community Household Panel (ECHP). By using the EU-SILC data, we are able to analyse 
household behaviour in the period 2003-2008. A prominent characteristic of this survey is 
the rotating sample design. The first quarter of the sample is replaced each year. Hence, the 
sample of households is fully renewed after four years. 
We use the spells of unemployment that start after a period of employment (i.e. left-
censored spells are withheld). A spell can end with re-employment or with right-censoring. 
The latter can be the result of an activity status different from (un)employment
4
, or can be 
due to non-observation in the next period. Consequently, unemployment spells that 
outreach the period of observation, are automatically right-censored. Only the first 
unemployment spell of each individual is included. During the 6 year time interval, we 
observe 1048 unemployment spells of which 26 are dropped from the sample because of 
missing values for one or more of the explanatory variables. Yet another 9 spells are filtered 
out for the individuals indicating they enjoy “free housing accommodation”. From the 
remaining 1013 unemployment spells, 557 spells are fully recorded and 456 spells are right-
censored. 
                                                          
4
 Possible destinations are retirement, being permanently disabled or taking up domestic tasks and care 
responsibilities. 
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In the EU-SILC dataset, the labour market status is observed monthly. For 
comparison, it is measured with a weekly frequency in the Danish dataset of Munch et al. 
(2006). Labour market observations in the BHPS used by Battu et al. (2008) are also monthly. 
Figure 1 reports non-parametric Kaplan-Meier estimates of the monthly transition out of 
unemployment by housing status at the start of the unemployment spell in our dataset. 
Panel A illustrates that owners and tenants show similar transition patterns when we merge 
outright owners and owners with mortgage payments into one group. By contrast, when we 
distinguish the latter two categories of owners, as presented in Panel B, we find clear 
differences between the three housing options. Outright owners have, on average, the 
longest unemployment spells (with a median duration of 33 months). Tenants and 
mortgagees have shorter spells with a median duration of 8 respectively 5 months. However, 
since this comparison does not take selection on neither observable nor unobservable 
characteristics into account, we cannot conclude from this descriptive evidence that the 
transition out of unemployment happens slower for outright owners. These particular 
individuals might have very low chances to leave unemployment fast because of other 
factors that are dominant within the group of outright owners. The econometric method 
that we apply in this paper takes the selection on (un)observable characteristics into account 
and leads therefore to a better founded answer to our research question. 
The mean and standard deviation of the explanatory variables used in our analysis 
are listed in Table 1. As a matter of illustration, these two statistics are shown for each 
housing status separately as well. For all the explanatory variables in both the 
unemployment duration model and the housing status model, we use their value at the start 
of the unemployment spell, and then keep it constant. If these variables were not kept 
constant, the assumption of strict exogeneity would be violated due to the possibility of 
reverse causality (see the next section for a more extensive elaboration on this).
5
 EU-SILC 
measures the status of all these explanatory variables with a yearly frequency, at the start of 
each calendar year (around March). Also the housing status is measured with a yearly 
frequency. Given our monthly observations of the labour market status, we interpolate in 
 
                                                          
5
 The only explanatory variable that we allow to vary during unemployment spells is the regional 
unemployment rate. This variable is strictly exogenous all the way. It contributes to the model by capturing the 
business cycle at the regional level. Belgium consists of three regions (Flanders, Wallonia and Brussels). 
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Figure 1: Kaplan-Meier estimates – unemployment duration by housing status 
A. Owners versus tenants 
 
B. Mortgagees versus outright owners versus tenants 
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics of Explanatory Variables 
 
Overall Tenants Outright owners Mortgagees 
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. 
Housing tenure categories 
Tenant 0.35 (0.48)       
Outright owner 0.23 (0.42)             
Mortgagee 0.42 (0.49)             
Explanatory variables used in both unemployment duration and housing equations 
Woman 0.57 (0.49) 0.59 (0.49) 0.46 (0.50) 0.62 (0.48) 
Foreign nationality 0.15 (0.36) 0.23 (0.42) 0.07 (0.25) 0.14 (0.35) 
Age 16-24 years 0.09 (0.29) 0.14 (0.35) 0.06 (0.24) 0.07 (0.25) 
Age 25-34 years 0.31 (0.46) 0.36 (0.48) 0.15 (0.36) 0.36 (0.48) 
Age 35-49 years 0.33 (0.47) 0.33 (0.47) 0.18 (0.38) 0.41 (0.49) 
Age ≥ 50 years 0.27 (0.44) 0.16 (0.37) 0.61 (0.49) 0.17 (0.37) 
Low educated 0.27 (0.44) 0.32 (0.47) 0.28 (0.45) 0.22 (0.42) 
Middle educated 0.40 (0.49) 0.43 (0.50) 0.44 (0.50) 0.37 (0.48) 
High educated 0.33 (0.47) 0.26 (0.44) 0.28 (0.45) 0.41 (0.49) 
Cohabiting partner 0.66 (0.47) 0.51 (0.50) 0.65 (0.48) 0.80 (0.40) 
Working partner 0.42 (0.49) 0.30 (0.46) 0.27 (0.45) 0.61 (0.49) 
Having children younger than 18 0.52 (0.50) 0.46 (0.50) 0.24 (0.43) 0.72 (0.45) 
Densely populated area 0.54 (0.50) 0.67 (0.47) 0.49 (0.50) 0.45 (0.50) 
Brussels 0.12 (0.33) 0.19 (0.40) 0.09 (0.28) 0.08 (0.27) 
Flanders 0.53 (0.50) 0.50 (0.50) 0.58 (0.49) 0.53 (0.50) 
Wallonia 0.34 (0.48) 0.30 (0.46) 0.33 (0.47) 0.39 (0.49) 
Unemployment rate (province) 0.12 (0.06) 0.13 (0.06) 0.12 (0.06) 0.12 (0.06) 
Unemployment rate (region) 0.11 (0.06) 0.12 (0.06) 0.11 (0.05) 0.11 (0.05) 
Explanatory variables used only in housing equations 
% homeowners (province) 0.67 (0.10) 0.65 (0.12) 0.68 (0.09) 0.68 (0.09) 
House price to rent ratio in year of 
contract (province) 
1.47 (0.63) 1.79 (0.78) 1.20 (0.43) 1.36 (0.45) 
Source: own calculations based on EU-SILC data, except for unemployment rate (VDAB, FOREM, Belgostat, Vlaamse 
Arbeidsrekening), homeownership rate (Social-Economic Survey 2011) and house price to rent ratio. (FOD 
Economie, Belgian Federal Government) 
A more detailed definition of each variable is given in appendix A.1. 
the spirit of van Leuvensteijn and Koning (2004) and Battu et al. (2008) the yearly 
observations for the explanatory variables into monthly observations. We assume that the 
monthly values from October of year y-1 until September of year y equal the observed yearly 
value in year y.
6
 This may unavoidably cause some measurement errors. Housing status may 
in some cases be misperceived. As an example, it might be possible that an individual 
                                                          
6
 The interpolation that we impose assigns the yearly observation in EU-SILC s to six months before and six 
months after the moment of measurement (around March). This also brings the advantage of a larger sample. 
When new households enter the panel in year y, data is collected also about their labour market situation in 
the twelve months of y-1. Spells that start in October of y-1 can therefore also be included in our sample. 
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becomes unemployed in October of year y-1 and changes tenure in December of that year. 
In that case our interpolation would imply a wrong value for the housing status variable 
related to this unemployment spell. Van Leuvensteijn and Koning (2004) also recognize this 
possibility of measurement error, but state that there are no strong a priori beliefs that 
these errors lead to an important bias in the estimation results. Considering the results of a 
sensitivity analysis that we did, we agree. More precisely, we imposed for the yearly 
observed explanatory variables an alternative interpolation, namely that the monthly values 
from January until December of year y equal the observed yearly value of year y. Estimating 
our model for exactly the same sample (including the maximum number of unemployment 
spells that can be included under both types of interpolation), our results are very similar. 
Estimated values for the key coefficients in our model differ by much less than one standard 
error (details are available upon request). 
Table 1 shows that, concerning the housing status, mortgagees constitute the largest 
fraction in our dataset, followed by tenants. When inspecting the explanatory variables used 
in both unemployment duration and housing equations by housing status at the start of the 
unemployment spell, we see that the subsample of outright owners contains relatively more 
individuals (61%) who are older than 50. As re-employment chances for the elderly are 
relatively low in Belgium (OECD, 2012), this immediately provides one example of a factor 
that could have biased the descriptive evidence in Figure 1. When further comparing 
outright owners and mortgagees, it can be observed that the latter group comprises 
relatively more female, foreign, high-educated and cohabiting individuals. In addition, 
compared to both groups of owners, more tenants have a foreign background, are low-
educated, are single and are living in a densely populated area. 
The lower part of Table 1 shows the two variables that serve as instruments in order 
to control for the endogeneity of housing tenure. First, we follow van Leuvensteijn and 
Koning (2004) and Munch et al. (2006, 2008) and introduce the percentage of homeowners 
in the province into our model. This fraction ought to have a positive effect on the 
probability of becoming a homeowner. The validity of this instrument is discussed 
thoroughly by van Leuvensteijn and Koning (2004). Note, however, that Coulson and Fisher 
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(2009) challenge this validity
7
. We will therefore also conduct a sensitivity analysis without 
this instrument. We iterate this exercise for the other instrument as well. As our second 
instrument, we use the ratio of the market price of houses to the rental price at the level of 
the province, and in the year of signing the rental contract for tenants or the year of 
purchase for homeowners. When buying a house is relatively inexpensive in comparison to 
renting, the probability of becoming a homeowner instead of a tenant will increase. 
Furthermore, this instrument contributes to explaining the probability of being an outright 
owner versus a mortgage holder. When house prices are relatively high, households will be 
compelled to borrow larger amounts. One can expect this to imply longer repayment 
periods, reducing the probability that individuals will be outright owners. Since this price 
ratio is computed at the aggregate provincial level and concerns the past, the assumption of 
exogeneity is respected. 
3. Methodology 
3.1. Model 
In order to investigate the effect of housing status on the duration of unemployment, we 
adopt an econometric framework that builds on those presented by van Leuvensteijn and 
Koning (2004), Munch et al. (2006) and Battu et al. (2008). On the one hand, the part of the 
model that describes the transition into employment is specified as a mixed proportional 
hazard model. On the other hand, given the potential endogeneity of the housing status, for 
which the former contributions have given evidence, we simultaneously model the 
probability of being an outright homeowner, a mortgagee or a tenant as captured by a 
mixed multinomial logit model. We allow that the unobserved heterogeneity captured in 
both models is mutually correlated. 
Our model differs from the models of the aforementioned studies in three main 
aspects. First, in order to disentangle the effect of being a homeowner with or without 
mortgage payments, we model the housing status as a multinomial logit model instead of a 
                                                          
7
 Coulson and Fisher emphasize external effects. Regional homeownership rates may affect wage setting and 
other costs of doing business in a region. This may affect individuals’ chances on the labour market. The use of 
regional homeownership rates as exclusion restriction would then be invalid. 
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binary logit model. Battu et al. (2008) used the same practice to disentangle the diverging 
influence of social renting and private market renting. Second, like for all explanatory 
variables, we model the housing status only at the start of the unemployment spell and use 
only this (time-constant) status to explain unemployment duration. Our procedure is in 
contrast with the former contributions which model the housing status for each month of 
the unemployment spell and include this time-varying housing status variable in the 
unemployment duration model. We believe, however, that the latter approach may lead to 
an endogeneity bias as a change in housing status during the unemployment spell might be 
caused by the unemployment duration. Third, since in our data we do not measure time 
continuously but on a monthly basis, we take this time-grouping explicitly into account in the 
specification of the model and - ipso facto - of the likelihood function. The alternative option 
is to estimate a pure continuous time model on these time-grouped data as if the data were 
continuous. Although adopted by most of the aforementioned studies, this approximation 
may lead to substantial estimation biases. Gaure et al. (2007, p.1178) argue, based on their 
extensive Monte Carlo assessment of the Timing of Events approach, that this is due to the 
approximation’s inherent failure in locating the appropriate unobserved heterogeneity 
distribution. 
3.1.1. Unemployment duration model 
In our unemployment duration model, the time interval Δt is normalized to one month. The 
hazard rate
8
 into employment is specified as follows
9
: 
( ) ( ) ( )ϑ λ δ δ= + + +, , , exp1 1 12 2 2t z z v t z z vx x'β , (1) 
where t is the elapsed duration since the individual became unemployed. x is the vector of 
observed individual characteristics introduced in the previous section and v is a component 
capturing unobserved heterogeneity. The baseline hazard λ(t), representing the duration 
dependence in the hazard rate, is specified as a piecewise constant non-parametric function. 
Last - and most important - the dummy variables z1 and z2 capture whether the individual is 
a tenant respectively a homeowner without mortgage payments at the start of the 
                                                           
8
 The hazard rate is defined as the probability to flow into employment at date t conditional on being 
unemployed up to t. See Kiefer (1988) for an introduction into duration analysis. 
9
 To avoid cumbersome notation, we ignore that the regional unemployment rate is a time-varying covariate. 
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unemployment spell (being a homeowner with mortgage payments is the reference 
category). These variables indicate the causal effect of a particular housing status at the start 
of the unemployment spell on the transition rate out of unemployment afterwards. 
3.1.2. Housing status model 
The probability of each housing status type at the start of the unemployment spell is 
specified by a multinomial logit model with unobserved effects: 
( ) ( )( ) ( )
+
= =
+ + + +
ɶ
ɶ
ɶ ɶ
exp
Pr , ,1 2
1 exp exp1 2
u
h
y h u u
u u
x'α
h
x
x'α x'α1 2
 (2) 
in which h = {1,2} and y = 3 – 2z1 – z2. Furthermore, u1 and u2 represent the unobserved 
heterogeneity in the housing status model. The probability of the reference housing status, 
i.e. homeowner with mortgage payments, is then given by: 
( ) ( )− = − =ɶ ɶ1 Pr 1 , , Pr 2 , ,1 12 2y u u y u ux x . (3) 
x
~ is a vector containing x supplemented with the set of additional variables only affecting 
the housing status on which we elaborated in the previous section. This exclusion restriction 
is an important issue with respect to the econometric identification of the housing status 
effect.
10
 Therefore, as a sensitivity analysis we will re-estimate the model for subsets of the 
instruments. 
3.2. Estimation 
3.2.1. Likelihood conditional on unobserved heterogeneity distribution 
The coefficients of the presented model are estimated by maximum likelihood estimation. 
We assume that all sources of correlation between the unemployment duration and the 
housing tenure processes - beyond those captured by the observed explanatory variables - 
can be represented by the (time-invariant and individual-specific) unobserved heterogeneity 
terms. We first derive the likelihood contributions of these two processes conditional on the 
unobserved components u1, u2 and v. 
                                                           
10
 The alternative identification strategy is to exploit the multiple spell feature of the data which is, however, 
not an option given that we observe only few unemployment spells during which the individual’s housing 
status mutates. 
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Concerning the unemployment durations we assume that the censoring times are 
stochastically independent of the corresponding job durations and the explanatory variables. 
The conditional likelihood of T, which is the unemployment duration as observed in the 
dataset, of a particular individual can be described as
11
:  
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )ϑ ϑ ϑ−−= − − − −∑ ∑ ∑
= = =
      
            
(1 ) ( )1
x, , , exp exp exp1 2 1 1 1
c c
T T T
f T z z v t t tT t t t
. (4) 
This equation expresses the probability of leaving unemployment between T-1 and T (first 
factor of the RHS) if T is not censored, i.e. if c is 0. If T is censored, i.e. if c is 1, the likelihood 
of T equals the survival probability. 
The individual likelihood of y, the housing status at the start of the unemployment 
spell of an individual, is given by: 
( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
=
− −
= = − = − =
 
 
ɶ
ɶ ɶ ɶ ɶ
Pr y , ,1 2
(1 )1 21 2Pr 1 , , Pr 2 , , 1 Pr 1 , , Pr 2 , ,1 1 1 12 2 2 2
u u
z zz z
y u u y u u y u u y u u
x
x x x x
 (5)
 
3.2.2. Integrated likelihood 
To obtain the unconditional likelihood contributions, we integrate the conditional 
contributions over the unobserved heterogeneity distribution. In this respect, we adopt a 
non-parametric discrete distribution by analogy with Heckman and Singer (1984).
12
 We 
estimate, in the spirit of van den Berg et al. (2002), our model for an optimal number K - 
optimal according to reliable information criteria - of heterogeneity types in the population 
under investigation. Their proportions are specified as logistic transforms: 
=
∑
=
exp( )
exp( )
1
q
kp
k K
q jj      , with k = [1,K] and qk parameters to estimate (q1 normalized to 0). (6) 
                                                           
11
 To avoid cumbersome notation, we simplified the notation for theta. 
12
 The methodology as advocated by these authors boils down to the assumption that a sample consists of a 
finite number of subsamples with different levels of time-invariant unobservable effects. Then, for all 
subsamples the corresponding proportions are estimated as well as the impact of the unobserved differences 
on the outcomes. 
, with k = [1,K] and qk parameters to be estimated 
   (q1 normalized to 0). (6) 
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Besides the estimation of these proportions, this approach induces the estimation of one 
mass point (location) for u1, u2 and v for each heterogeneity type: u1k, u2k resp. vk (u11, u21 
resp. v1 are normalized to 0)
13
.
14 
Hence, the likelihood for an agent i is: 
( ) ( )= ⋅ ⋅∑
=
ɶx, , , Pr y , ,1 12 21
K
l p f T z z v u uTi kk
x . (7) 
We can then write the unconditional log-likelihood as the sum of the unconditional 
individual log-likelihood contributions: 
= ∑
=1
N
L lii
. (8) 
4. Results 
4.1. Basic results 
Table 2 shows our main estimation results of the model. The Akaike Information Criterion 
(AIC) indicates an optimal number of two heterogeneity types (K=2)
15
. Homeowners with 
mortgage payments (who are the reference group) have ceteris paribus the shortest 
unemployment spells. Outright owners, by contrast, stay unemployed the longest. Their 
monthly probability to be re-employed is 39% lower than the re-employment probability of 
owners with mortgage payments
16
.
 
Our results are consistent with the intuition that having 
to make a monthly payment increases the incentive of finding a job. Tenants have a 21% 
lower probability to exit from unemployment each month compared to mortgagees.  
                                                           
13
 We impose this normalisation since we allow for a constant term in the vector of observed characteristics x. 
14
 We take both the locations and the probabilities of the mass points to be unknown parameters without 
constraining the correlation between u1, u2, and v. Allowing only perfect correlation or no correlation or a priori 
limiting the number of heterogeneity types to an arbitrary number – the latter constraint is adopted in most of 
the mentioned former contributions – may lead to biased estimates, as shown by Gaure et al. (2007). The 
estimation procedure for gathering the probabilities and locations of the mass points is implemented according 
to the latter authors. 
15
 Table A.2 in the Appendix reveals that the alternative information criteria (Hannan-Quinn Information 
Criterion and Bayesian Information Criterion) indicate an optimal number of only 1 type (K=1). Following the 
argument in Gaure et al. (2007), we believe that the AIC is preferable when the sample is relatively small. 
Nevertheless, we also report in Table A.3 in the Appendix (column 1) the estimation results of the main 
coefficients in our model when we allow only one single heterogeneity type. The results are very similar to 
those obtained from estimation with K=2. Note that Battu et al. (2008) also model two heterogeneity types. 
Van Leuvensteijn and Koning (2004) specify three, Munch et al. (2006) no less than eight. 
16
 1 – exp(-0.50) = 0.39. 
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Table 2: Unemployment duration and housing model – estimation results 
Exit to employment Tenant Outright owner 
Explanatory variables 
Tenant -0.24 **  (0.11) 
Outright owner  -0.50 *** (0.18) 
Constant -3.06 *** (0.45) 0.16   (0.99) 0.14 (1.23) 
Woman -0.10   (0.10) 0.24 (0.19) -0.09   (0.22) 
Foreign nationality -0.01   (0.13) 0.53 ** (0.26) -0.36   (0.41) 
Age 16-24 years 0.11   (0.18) 0.30   (0.33) 0.11   (0.47) 
Age 25-34 years 0.33 *** (0.11) -0.06 (0.22) 0.04   (0.34) 
Age ≥ 50 years -0.84 *** (0.15) -0.14   (0.28) 1.62 *** (0.31) 
Low educated -0.02   (0.12) 0.01   (0.22) -0.63 ** (0.28) 
High educated 0.34 *** (0.11) -0.80 *** (0.22) -0.55 ** (0.26) 
Cohabiting partner 0.33 ** (0.15) -0.71 *** (0.26) -0.35   (0.31) 
Working partner 0.15   (0.14) -0.74 *** (0.25) -0.52  (0.29) 
Having children younger than 18 -0.17   (0.11) -0.94 *** (0.20) -1.49 *** (0.27) 
Densely populated area -0.06   (0.10) 0.64 *** (0.19) 0.45  * (0.24) 
Brussels 2.55 ** (0.99) -3.01   (2.35) -0.10   (2.62) 
Wallonia 1.50 *** (0.56) -1.59   (1.10) -1.01   (1.26) 
Unemployment rate (province) -0.22   (2.06) 12.53 *** (4.56) -0.30   (6.20) 
Unemployment rate (region) -1.08 *** (0.37) 0.42   (0.74) 0.46   (0.87) 
% homeowners (province) 0.13   (0.37) 0.17   (0.48) 
House price to rent ratio (province)    1.09 *** (0.15) -1.03 ***  (0.27) 
Duration dependence 
t = [1] (ref.) 
t = [2] 0.25 * (0.14) 
t = [3] -0.11   (0.16) 
t = [4,6] -0.41 *** (0.14) 
t = [7,9] -0.88 *** (0.18) 
t = [10,12] -0.40 ** (0.17) 
t = [13,15] -0.94 *** (0.28) 
t > 15 -1.68 *** (0.26) 
Unobserved heterogeneity: estimates 
v2/u1,2/u2,2 0.80   (1.31) -20.00   8.81 (8.19) 
q2 -3.99 *** (0.76) 
Unobserved heterogeneity: resulting probabilities and correlation 
p1 0.98 
p2 
Corr(v,u1) 
Corr(v,u2) 
Corr(u1,u2) 
0.02 
-1.00 
1.00 
-1.00 
Log-likelihood -2645.44 
Akaike Information Criterion 5420.89 
Parameters 65 
N 1013 
***(**)((*)) indicates significance at the 1%(5%)((10%)) significance level. Standard errors in parentheses. Some 
heterogeneity parameters are estimated as a very large negative or positive number causing a 0 or 1 probability with 
respect to related housing tenure status for a subset of individuals. This is numerically problematic. When we face this 
problem, in the spirit of Gaure et al. (2007), we mark the offending parameter as ‘infinity’, stick it to -20 resp. 20, and keep 
it out of further estimation. 
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The outlined results underline the importance of distinguishing outright owners and 
mortgagees for an adequate analysis of the relationship between housing and labour market 
outcomes. In particular, they confirm the hypotheses that we derived from Rouwendal and 
Nijkamp (2010) in the introduction to this paper. Furthermore, they may help to understand 
the mixed findings in former contributions that did not distinguish the two types of owners. 
The very high fraction of mortgagees in Denmark (73%) may explain why Munch et al. (2006) 
find faster exit rates for owners than for tenants. Along the same line of thought, the more 
balanced composition of the group of owners in the UK, where only 56% are mortgagees, 
may explain why Battu et al. (2008) find no significant difference in the exit rates of owners 
and private tenants
17
. In Table 1 we reported data on the composition of the group of 
owners in Belgium. With 64.6% of them holding a mortgage, Belgium takes a position 
somewhat in the middle between the UK and Denmark. The empirical results that we 
present in Table A.4 in the Appendix should then come as no surprise. The table contains the 
outcome of a more restricted version of our model in which we do not distinguish between 
both categories of homeowners. Merging outright owners and mortgagees, we find no 
significantly different exit rate from unemployment compared to tenants anymore. This 
result is in line with Battu et al. (2008).  
Although our methodology does not allow interpreting the coefficients of the other 
explanatory variables structurally, their sign and level of statistical significance reveal some 
information about the control variables. The observed effects on unemployment duration on 
the left side of Table 2, are generally consistent with our expectations. Ceteris paribus, 
unemployment spells tend to last longer for individuals who are older than 50, not highly 
educated and not cohabiting. Although the latter is also found by Munch et al. (2006) and 
Battu et al. (2008), it might seem rather odd. A possible explanation could be the 
appearance of positive network effects that are associated with having a partner. Also, 
unemployment replacement rates are slightly lower when cohabiting
18
. Last, we see that 
regional dummies and the regional unemployment rate help to determine unemployment 
duration as well. 
                                                           
17
 The percentages that we mention have been derived from the EU-SILC database by Dol and Neuteboom 
(2009). 
18
 Data are available from Van Vliet and Caminada (2012). 
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The other columns of Table 2 show the results of the simultaneously estimated mixed 
multinomial logit model for housing tenure. Also for this component of our model, the 
coefficients of the explanatory variables show the expected sign. We are particularly 
interested in the performance of the selected instruments. The percentage of homeowners 
in the province has only low explanatory power. A possible explanation might be the large 
scale of the province, summing away most variation. In earlier studies, the municipality was 
selected as the aggregate level allowing for more variation. Much higher predictive power is 
attained by the provincial relative price of buying a house versus renting in the year of 
contract/purchase. In line with our expectations, a high ratio causes a higher probability of 
renting and a lower probability of being an outright owner. 
4.2. Additional results and robustness checks 
We conducted several sensitivity analyses to test the robustness of our main finding, i.e. the 
longer unemployment duration for outright owners compared to tenants and mortgagees. 
Table A.3 in the Appendix shows the estimated coefficients and corresponding standard 
errors for our main variables of interest. We summarize the results here: 
- We re-estimated our basic model first omitting one of the two instruments while 
maintaining the other. Then we re-estimated the model without including any 
instruments. The main results of the three additional estimations are shown in 
columns (2), (3) and (4) of Table A.3. The results without the provincial 
homeownership rate as instrument are close to the benchmark model. When not 
including the house price to rent ratio in the year of purchase or contract, the 
standard errors increase and so does the estimated coefficient for outright owners. 
The difference between homeowners with a mortgage and tenants is no longer 
significant. These results are close to those in column (4), the model without 
instruments. These findings underscore the importance of introducing the innovative 
relative price of owning versus renting as an instrument. 
- We re-estimated our model dropping all individuals older than 50 from our sample. As 
was clear from our description of the data in Section 2, there is a strong correlation 
between being older than 50 and being an outright owner. Although we control for 
age in our estimations, it could be advisable to check whether our results are not in 
some way driven by this age group. As is well-known, and confirmed in Table 2, 
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people older than 50 have typically longer unemployment spells. When we drop 
individuals older than 50, all our basic findings survive. We report the main results of 
this re-estimation in column (5) of Table A.3. 
- Finally, we introduced alternative age variables in column (6). More precisely, instead 
of four crude age categories, we directly included individuals’ age and its square as 
continuous explanatory variables. All our basic findings again survive. 
5. Conclusions 
Seminal work by A.J. Oswald (1996, 1997) suggests that homeownership impairs an 
individual’s labour market outcome. A key element is that high costs of buying and selling 
homes make homeowners less geographically mobile, which reduces the number of suitable 
vacancies within their reach in the case of job loss. Homeowners should therefore be 
expected to incur longer unemployment spells than tenants. Existing microeconometric 
research for the UK and Denmark, however, comes to different conclusions. Battu et al. 
(2008) find no significant difference in the speed of transition from unemployment into 
employment among homeowners versus private tenants in the UK. Munch et al. (2006) even 
observe a faster exit from unemployment into employment among owners than among 
tenants in a large panel of Danish individuals.  
This paper examines the impact of housing tenure choice on unemployment duration in 
Belgium using EU-SILC micro data for 2003-2008. Our research question and methodology 
are basically the same as those of the aforementioned studies. We contribute to the 
literature in distinguishing homeowners with mortgage payments and outright homeowners. 
We simultaneously estimate unemployment duration by a mixed proportional hazard model, 
and the probability of being an outright homeowner, a homeowner with mortgage payments 
or a tenant by a mixed multinomial logit model. To be able to correctly identify the causal 
influence of different types of housing tenure on unemployment duration, we use 
instrumental variables. Finding good instruments is always a delicate task. We propose a 
new (and strong) instrument, which is the relative price of buying versus renting a house at 
the moment in the past that people signed the contract underlying their current tenure. 
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Our results show that homeowners with a mortgage exit unemployment first. Outright 
owners stay unemployed the longest. Tenants take an intermediate position. From the point 
of view of the Oswald hypothesis these findings cannot be rationalized as the search and 
transaction costs associated with moving are similar for outright owners and mortgagees. 
Instead, our results support the theoretical framework developed by Rouwendal and 
Nijkamp (2010) and the role of housing costs. If the latter are high, liquidity constraints and 
the induced reduction of consumption generate strong incentives for the unemployed to 
find a job soon. Search intensity will be high, the unemployment spell short. If housing costs 
are low, by contrast, search behaviour will be less intense and the unemployment spell 
longer. The fact that ceteris paribus the monthly burden of housing costs is much higher for 
mortgagees than for outright owners, with tenants again in the middle (although 
undoubtedly closer to mortgagees) can rationalize our empirical findings.  
Our results also provide a possible explanation for the discrepancy between the former 
contributions to this literature. When the distinction between both groups of homeowners is 
not taken into account, the perceived effect of homeownership will basically be the result of 
the composition of the group of owners. A much higher share of mortgage holders within 
the group of homeowners in Denmark compared to the UK may explain the different 
findings of Munch et al. (2006) versus Battu et al. (2008).  
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Appendix A: Additional tables 
Table A.1: Definitions of variables 
Variable name Definition 
Tenant Dummy equals 1 if the household rents the house. 
Outright owner Dummy equals 1 if the household owns the house and no mortgage payments 
have to be made. 
Mortgagee Dummy equals 1 if the household owns the house and pays off a mortgage. 
Woman Dummy equals 1 for females, 0 for males. 
Foreign nationality Dummy equals 1 if the individual has a foreign nationality, 0 if not. 
Age 16-24 years Dummy equals 1 if the individual is 16-24 years old. 
Age 25-34 years Dummy equals 1 if the individual is 25-34 years old. 
Age 35-49 years Dummy equals 1 if the individual is 35-49 years old. 
Age ≥ 50 years Dummy equals 1 if the individual is ≥ 50 years old. 
Low educated Dummy equals 1 if the individual did not finish secondary education. 
Middle educated Dummy equals 1 in case of a secondary or post-secondary non tertiary degree. 
High educated Dummy equals 1 in case of a tertiary degree. 
Cohabiting partner Dummy equals 1 if the individual lives together with a partner, 0 otherwise. 
Working partner Dummy equals 1 if the individual lives together with a working partner, 0 if not. 
Having children younger than 18 Dummy equals 1 if the person has children younger than 18, 0 otherwise. 
Densely populated area Dummy equals 1 if the individual lives in a municipality with a density superior to 
100 inhabitants per square kilometer, and either with a total population for the 
set of at least 50,000 inhabitants or adjacent to a densely-populated area. 
Brussels Dummy equals 1 when living in the region Brussels. 
Flanders Dummy equals 1 when living in the region Flanders. 
Wallonia Dummy equals 1 when living in the region Wallonia. 
Unemployment rate (province) Unemployment rate in the province (continuous number between 0 and 1). 
Unemployment rate (region) Unemployment rate in the region (continuous number between 0 and 1). 
% homeowners (province) Percentage of homeowners in the province of residence. 
House price to rent ratio in year 
of contract (province) 
Ratio of the provincial house price index (with Belgium1990=100) to the rent 
index (with Belgium1990=100), calculated in the year of purchase or contract. 
Note: As explained in the text, values are fixed at the start of the unemployment spell for all variables except for the regional 
unemployment rate. 
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Table A.3: Unemployment duration and housing model – Sensitivity Analysis 
Exit to 
employment 
(0) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Benchmark 
results 
(Table 2) 
Estimating 
the 
benchmark 
model with 
K=1 
Omitting 
provincial  
rate of 
homeowner-
ship as 
instrument 
Omitting 
historical 
house price 
to rent 
ratio as 
instrument 
Estimating 
without 
instruments 
Omitting 
individuals 
older than 
50 from the 
sample 
Including age 
and age² as 
continuous 
explanatory 
variables 
Tenant -0.24 ** (0.11) -0.24 ** (0.11) -0.24 ** (0.11) -0.22 
 
(0.32) -0.23 
 
(0.32) -0.27 ** (0.11) -0.24 ** (0.11) 
Outright owner  -0.50 *** (0.18) -0.40 *** (0.13) -0.50 *** (0.18) -0.81 ** (0.41) -0.82 ** (0.41) -0.54 ** (0.23) -0.48 *** (0.18) 
Optimal K 2 - 2 3 3 2 2 
Log-likelihood -2645.44 -2654.28 -2645.56 -2701.89 -2703.20 -2033.56 -2643.29 
AIC 5420.89 5430.57 5417.11 5537.78 5536.36 4191.11 5410.57 
Parameters 65 61 63 67 65 62 62 
N 1013 1013 1013 1013 1013 739 1013 
***(**)((*)) indicates significance at the 1%(5%)((10%)) significance level. Standard errors in parentheses. Some heterogeneity 
parameters are estimated as a very large negative or positive number causing a 0 or 1 probability with respect to related housing 
tenure status for a subset of individuals. This is numerically problematic. When we face this problem, in the spirit of Gaure et al. 
(2007), we mark the offending parameter as ‘infinity’, stick it to -20 resp. 20, and keep it out of further estimation. 
 
 
  
      
Table A.2: Model selection (benchmark model) 
 
# param. Log-likelihood AIC HQIC BIC 
1 type 61 -2654.283 5430.566 6152.887* 5730.726* 
2 types 65 -2645.444 5420.888* 6190.575 5740.732 
3 types 69 -2642.842 5423.684 6240.7371 5763.211 
4 types 73 -2639.318 5424.635 6289.053 5783.844 
5 types 77 -2638.714 5431.428 6343.211 5810.320 
Note:   *: Preferred specification by this criterion. 
           AIC: Akaike Information Criterion. 
           HQIC: Hannan-Quinn Information Criterion. 
           BIC: Bayesian Information Criterion. 
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Table A.4: Unemployment duration and housing model (restricted) – estimation results 
Exit to employment Tenant 
Explanatory variables 
Tenant -0.05 
 
(0.12) 
   
Constant -3.30 *** (0.44) -0.68 
 
(0.97) 
Woman -0.09 
 
(0.09) 0.26 
 
(0.18) 
Foreign nationality -0.01 
 
(0.13) 0.64 *** (0.25) 
Age 16-24 years 0.10 
 
(0.17) 0.34 
 
(0.30) 
Age 25-34 years 0.33 *** (0.10) -0.07 
 
(0.22) 
Age ≥ 50 years -0.99 *** (0.15) -0.88 *** (0.26) 
Low educated 0.01 
 
(0.12) 0.22 
 
(0.21) 
High educated 0.36 *** (0.10) -0.63 *** (0.21) 
Cohabiting partner 0.35 ** (0.14) -0.63 *** (0.24) 
Working partner 0.20  (0.13) -0.64 *** (0.24) 
Having children younger than 18 -0.11 
 
(0.10) -0.57 *** (0.20) 
Densely populated area -0.10 
 
(0.09) 0.54 *** (0.18) 
Brussels 2.64 *** (0.92) -3.02 
 
(2.16) 
Wallonia 1.56 *** (0.51) -1.33 
 
(1.02) 
Unemployment rate (province) -0.55  (2.03) 14.00 *** (4.89) 
Unemployment rate (region) -1.10 *** (0.34) 0.26  (0.70) 
% homeowners (province) 
   
0.12 
 
(0.35) 
House price to rent ratio (province)    1.44 *** (0.18) 
Duration dependence 
t = [1] (ref.) 
t = [2] 0.26 * (0.13) 
t = [3] -0.10   (0.16) 
t = [4,6] -0.41 *** (0.14) 
t = [7,9] -0.87 *** (0.18) 
t = [10,12] -0.39 ** (0.17) 
t = [13,15] -0.95 *** (0.27) 
t > 15 -1.69 *** (0.26) 
Unobserved heterogeneity: estimates 
v2/u2 0.66   (0.54) -20.00   
q2 -2.64 *** (0.61) 
Unobserved heterogeneity: probabilities and correlation 
p1 0.933 
p2 
Corr(v,u) 
0.067 
-1.00 
Log-likelihood -2348.70 
Akaike Information Criterion 4785.39 
Parameters 44 
N 1013 
***(**)((*)) indicates significance at the 1%(5%)((10%)) significance level. Standard errors in parentheses. Some 
heterogeneity parameters are estimated as a very large negative or positive number causing a 0 or 1 probability with 
respect to related housing tenure status for a subset of individuals. This is numerically problematic. When we face this 
problem, in the spirit of Gaure et al. (2007), we mark the offending parameter as ‘infinity’, stick it to -20 resp. 20, and keep 
it out of further estimation. 
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